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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Cross-battery assessment relies on the classification of cognitive subtests into the Cattell-
Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory’s broad and narrow ability definitions.  Generally, broad 
ability classifications have used ability data analyzed through factor analytic methods, 
while narrow ability classifications have used data about subtest task demands.  The 
purpose of this investigation is to determine whether subtest similarity judgments based 
on task demands data, and judgments based on ability measurement provide similar 
results.  It includes two studies.  First, middle school students (N = 63) completed six 
target fluid reasoning subtests that were subjected to confirmatory factor analyses to 
analysis subtest similarities.  Second, school psychology practitioners (N = 32) sorted 
subtest descriptions into similarity groups.  Their judgments were analyzed with multiple 
non-hierarchical cluster analyses. Results partially confirmed that the six target subtests 
were classified similarly using both data types, though need to be interpreted cautiously 
due to limitations.  Implications for assessment practices are discussed. 
 
 vii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 IQ (intelligence) testing enjoys popular and widespread use among school 
psychologists (Pfeiffer, Reddy, Kletzel, Schmeizer & Boyer, 2000).  Each year, over one 
million IQ tests are individually administered to children in schools (Macmann & 
Barnett, 1997).  By median estimate, practitioners administer two to three IQ tests each 
week (Pfeiffer et al., 2000).  Although IQ testing has always been a constant part of 
school psychological practice, the way clinicians have interpreted IQ tests has evolved 
throughout the history of testing.  As part of that evolution, Flanagan and colleagues 
introduced a “cross-battery” method of test interpretation in the late 1990’s (Flanagan, 
Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).   
The term “cross-battery assessment” describes the practice of supplementing 
cognitive test batteries by using subtests from other cognitive tests in the context of a 
single individual assessment (Flanagan & McGrew, 1997; Flanagan, McGrew & Ortiz, 
2000; Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfanso, 2007; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998).  Its application 
rests on a synthesized version of John Carroll’s Three-Stratum theory (Carroll,1993) and 
Catell-Horn’s Gf-Gc theory (Horn & Noll, 1997).  The resulting intergration, termed the 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory (CHC; see McGrew, 2009), provides a standard 
nomenclature to describe a spectrum of human cognitive abilities for potential application 
to all cognitive test batteries.  Use of CHC theory and cross-battery assessment in clinical 
practice represents an effort to maximize how well a test represents the specturm of 
human cognitive ability to improve construct representation (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2001; 
Sattler, 2001).  
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 Whereas Spearman’s (1904) original theory of human intelligence focused on “g” 
as a critical construct of measurement, CHC theory describes the construct of intelligence 
as a hierarchy of abilities.  Spearman’s “g” reflects the most fundamental source of 
individual differences in mental ability, and the broadest level of ability (Stratum III). It 
subsumes 9 to 10 more specific, broad cognitive (Stratum II) abilities.  These broad 
abilities subsume even more specific narrow abilities (Stratum I).  The hierarchical nature 
of CHC theory stresses that a narrow ability, such as length estimation (the ability to 
estimate visual lengths without using measurement tools), describes just one part of 
visual-spatial processing, a broad ability.  Similarly, a broad ability like visual-spatial 
processing reflects just one part of general cognitive functioning. 
The practice of cross-battery assessment rests on single battery and multiple-
battery factor analyses that classify cognitive subtests into CHC’s Stratum II ability 
definitions. However, these factor analyses have not adequately classified subtests into 
narrow, Stratum I abilities.  Instead, subtests have been sorted into narrow abilities 
through use of a rational, expert consensus method (McGrew, 1997).  Scholars have 
relied on this method because a study designed to partition any particular subtest into its 
specific ability components (ie. “g”, broad abilities, and specific, narrow abilities) would 
be a major undertaking and require a very large sample on which a variety of subtests are 
factor analyzed  (Phelps, McGrew, Knopik & Ford, 2005).  Unlike factor analysis, expert 
consensus methods cannot rely upon the shared variance between ability scores to 
understand the ability(ies) a subtest may measure.  Instead, these methods use experts’ 
clinical judgments of subtests’ task similiarities to classify subtests that may appear to 
measure similar constructs.  Frisby and Parkin (2007) have suggested that rational 
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methods of classifying subtests are associated with a number of limitations.  Most 
importantly, these methods may confound ability and task demand variables.  
Accordingly, the classification of subtests into the narrowest of ability categories may 
represent a limitation of cross-battery assessment.  The proposed study hopes to begin to 
address this limitation by comparing factor and task analyses of subtest classification.   
History of Cognitive Test Interpretation 
Throughout the history of testing, cross-battery assessment has consistently 
represented an effort to integrate modern theories of cognitive abilities with the applied 
practice of cognitive assessment.  Across time, scholars have struggled to adequately 
define intelligence.  In 1921, when the Journal of Educational Psychology published a 
symposium where invited experts debated the nature of intelligence, there was little 
agreement on an appropriate definition (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002), a necessity for 
guiding IQ score interpretation.  Due to the controversy and ambiguity associated with 
the nature of intelligence as a construct, E.G. Boring suggested that “intelligence is what 
the tests test” (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002, p. 226).  Such a circular definition suggests that 
past psychometric methods of intelligence testing may have lacked an adequate 
theoretical foundation for interpretation.  Even more recently, researchers have noted that 
newer test batteries, such as the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition 
(WISC-III), “was not derived from a specific theoretical structure” (Watkins, Greenawalt 
& Marcell, 2002, p. 165; see also Esters, Ittenbach & Han, 1997).  Other scholars have 
noted similar theoretical problems with the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – 
Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; Keith et al., 2006; Wechsler, 2003a; Wechsler, 2003b). 
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Intelligence test interpretation throughout the decades.  Perhaps as a result of the 
difficulty in creating a theoretical definition of intelligence, the interpretation of 
intelligence tests has appeared atheoretical throughout its history.  Kamphaus, Petoskey, 
and Morgan (1997) describe the history of intelligence test interpretation in four stages, 
or waves.  In the first wave, dated around the beginning of the 20th century, and marked 
by the creation of Binet’s first IQ test, a cognitive score was used for the quantification 
and classification of individuals into categories of intellectual functioning. The second 
wave began around the later half of the 20th century, when IQ tests began to include 
subtests scores (Kamphaus, Petoskey & Morgan), clinical profile analysis defined test 
interpretation.  With profile analysis, clinicians began to compare an individual’s 
performance on one task relative to their performance on another task.  Test 
interpretation’s third wave began around the 1960s and 1970s when personal computers 
made factor analysis easier to perform.  Kamphaus and colleagues (1997) stress that 
factor analytic studies demonstrated that many of the clinical methods of profile analysis 
used in the second wave of interpretation lacked empirical support.  While this 
represented an important step forward, interpretation of IQ scores generally lacked a 
theoretical context to guide the process of assessment.  It was not until the more modern 
fourth wave of IQ score interpretation that “theory and measurement science [were] 
intermingled” (p. 41).  Kamphaus et al. (1997) labeled the fourth wave of test 
interpretation “Applying Theory to Intelligence Test Interpretation” (p. 43).  These 
authors suggest that the fourth wave can be characterized by an integrative method of 
interpretation where IQ scores are interpreted in the context of other clinical findings, 
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background information, and research results.  They stress the importance of a priori 
clinical hypothesis that are confirmed or disconfirmed by test results. 
Kamphaus et al.’s (1997) predictions for a future fifth wave of intelligence test 
interpretation focus on tests’ content validity, which favors strong theoretical definitions 
of intelligence (Kamphaus, Petoskey & Morgan, 1997).  Developments in Kamphaus et 
al.’s fifth wave can be considered somewhat similar to developments in the fourth wave 
of interpretation.  Whereas in the fourth wave, clinicians created hypothesis prior to 
assessment in order to be disconfirmed by the results, in the fifth wave, test developers 
may begin to use modern theories of intelligence prior to the construction of newer tests.  
The initial development of the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Ability - Revised 
(Woodcock & Johnson, 1989) may represent such a focus with the application of Gf-Gc 
theory (Horn & Noll, 1997) in its development (Kamphaus et. al.).  In general, the fifth 
wave’s focus on content validity underscores the need to strengthen the link between 
theory and practice in intelligence assessment (e.g. Woodcock, 1998). 
The Practice of Cross-Battery Assessment 
Cross-battery assessment encourages clinicians to move past the Full Scale IQ 
(FSIQ) when assessing cognitive ability, a controversial practice (McDermott, Fantuzzo 
& Glutting, 1990; McDermott, Fantuzzo, Glutting, Watkins & Baggaley, 1992; Watkins, 
Glutting, & Youngstrom, 2002, 2003).    McGrew and Flanagan (1997) suggest that a 
lack of adequate theory to guide test interpretation, and the poor content validity of many 
test batteries may be key reasons why many scholars and researchers have advocated for 
test interpretation to remain at the level of the FSIQ.  Moving interpretation past the FSIQ 
involves profile analysis, or the interpretation of an examinees’ patterns of test 
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performance (Sattler, 2001).  Intraindividual profile analysis (e.g. ipastive analysis) 
compares examinee performance on one set of tasks to his or her performance on another 
set of tasks.  To calculate ipsative scores, clinicians subtract an examinee’s performance 
on a subtest from the average of his performance on all subtests administered 
(McDermott et. al., 1992; Sattler, 2001).  Alternatively, interindividual profile analysis 
compares examinee performance on a set of tasks to a normative group (Sattler). 
When conducting intra and interindividual profile analyses, clinicians engage in 
the process of task analysis. Task analysis involves the comparison of functional task 
demands - mode of stimuli input and response output, required strategies and cognitive 
processes - from of a number of individual subtests in an effort to understand the 
relationship of peaks and valleys between those subtests.  As Kaufman (1994) 
demonstrates, subtests may be grouped based upon their sensitivity to attention and 
concentration, motor demands, visual organization, lack of motor coordination, or any 
other kind of functional requirement.  Perhaps because test interpretation may lack a 
comprehensive theoretical base, clinicians and researchers frequently analyze subtests’ 
functional demands using rational or intuitive methods (Frisby & Parkin, 2007).  As a 
result, task analyses may diverge “in accordance with each author’s personal orientation” 
(Kaufman, 1994, p.49) rather than reflect theoretically based constructs validated through 
scientific research.   
Some research has indicated that the practice of profile analysis adds little to the 
test interpretation process (McDermott, Fantuzzo & Glutting, 1990).  For instance, 
McDermott and colleagues (1992) have demonstrated that intraindividual analysis of 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Revised (WISC-R; Wechsler, 1974) subtest 
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scores explains about a third of the variance in achievement data that comparing subtest 
performance to a normative group explains (e.g. normative analysis).  These researchers 
also demonstrated that when regressed together on academic achievement, intraindividual 
analysis of cognitive scores (the difference between an examinee’s subtest performance 
compared to the mean of all subtests) does not explain additional variance after 
accounting for variance explain by interindividual analysis of cognitive scores.  
Researchers have also documented similar findings using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) and the Differential Ability 
Scale (DAS; Elliot, 1990) test batteries (McDermott & Glutting, 1997).   
Though interindividual analysis explains more variance than intraindividual 
analysis, some researchers also advocate against its use in clinical practice as well.  
Joseph Glutting and colleagues (Glutting, Watkins, Konold & McDermott, 2006; Kahana, 
Youngstrom, & Glutting, 2002; McDermott, Fantuzzo, & Glutting, 1990; Watkins, 
Glutting & Youngstrom, 2005; Youngstrom, Kogos, & Glutting, 1999; Watkins, Glutting 
& Lei, 2007) argue that a FSIQ is the best predictor of academic achievement and stress 
that currently there is no evidence that more specific abiltities can match the ability of g 
to predict a variety of achievement outcomes (Watkins, Glutting, & Youngstrom, 2002, 
2003).  They also emphasize that there is minimal difference between the amount of 
variance explained by a group of more specific cognitive abilities when compared to “g.” 
However, others argue that it may be premature to stop the search for more 
specific abilities that influence learning (Carroll, 1993; McGrew & Flanagan, 1997; Oh, 
Glutting, Watkins, Youngstrom, & McDermott, 2004).  Many of these scholars suggest 
that negative research findings regarding the importance of specific cognitive abilities (in 
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contrast to the single general factor “g”) may be due to a lack of content validity in 
modern tests. Several cognitive batteries have lacked strong theoretical evidence 
(Kamphaus, Petoskey & Morgan, 1997), which could be an important factor behind the 
negative findings of aptitude by treatment interactions studies (e.g. Cronbach & Snow, 
1977).  In light of developments in theories of intelligence, and more strongly theory-
linked batteries of intelligence, McGrew and Flanagan (1997) stress that specific 
cognitive abilities may indeed have important implications in student learning and 
achievement.  As a result, scholars advocate for testing practices that include the full 
spectrum of cognitive abilities.  Some research has begun to demonstrate the importance 
of more specific cognitive abilities in explaining academic difficulties in domains such as 
mathematics (Floyd, Evans, & McGrew, 2003), reading (Evans, Floyd, McGrew, & 
LeForgee, 2002; Flanagan, 2000) and writing (Floyd, McGrew & Evans, 2008). 
Cross-Battery Assessment Knowledge Basis 
 Cross-battery assessment is based on three important areas of information, termed 
“pillars” (Flanagan & McGrew, 1997; Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007; McGrew & 
Flanagan, 1997).  The foundations of cross-battery assessment are designed to maximize 
content validity by reducing construct irrelevant variance and construct 
underrepresentation (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  An assessment that is invalid 
due to construct underrepresentation is too narrow and does not sample from important 
dimensions of the construct it attempts to measure (Merrick, 1995).  For intelligence 
tests, construct underrepresentation can occur when an assessment fails to measure 
important cognitive abilities (Flanagan & McGrew, 1997).  Conversely, construct 
irrelevant variance is found in assessments that are too broad and inadvertently include 
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constructs separate from the target variable(s) in their measurements (Merrick, 1995).  
Construct irrelevant variance can create interpretational difficulty by confounding 
multiple constructs within one measurement score.  If a subtest measures more than one 
ability then it can be difficult to understand which ability most influenced an examinee’s 
performance on that test. 
 Cross-Battery Pillar I.   Cross-battery assessment’s first pillar rests on the use of 
CHC theory as a guiding framework.  Using CHC theory to guide assessment allows 
clinicians to construct assessments that more fully represent all human cognitive abilities.  
Moreover, since most current major test batteries are based on CHC theory, it represents 
a unifying framework that is applicable to nearly all modern intelligence batteries. 
 Cross-Battery Pillar II.  Confirmatory factor analyses have allowed researchers to 
classify subtests into the broad abilities described by CHC theory.  These classifications 
represent the second pillar of cross-battery assessment and a mechanism by which 
clinicians can protect against invalid assessment due to construct underrepresentation and 
construct irrelevant variance (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  Published references 
(e.g. Flanagan, McGrew & Ortiz, 2000; Flanagan, Ortiz, & Alfonso, 2007; McGrew & 
Flanagan, 1998) provide guidelines by which clinicians can select major subtests that 
measure broad abilities outlined by CHC theory.  Flanagan et al. (2007) note that valid 
cross-battery assessments rely on these classifications in order to include strong, 
empirically validated measures of abilities in assessments.  These authors suggest that 
subtests appearing to be mixed measures of two or more different abilities introduce 
construct irrelevant variance into ability scores, and therefore should be avoided for 
assessment purposes.   
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 Cross-Battery Pillar III.  Classification of subtests into narrow abilities represents 
cross-battery assessment’s third pillar (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  Similar to 
pillar II, these classifications are important when guarding against construct 
underrepresentation in assessment, but at this level construct underrepresentation refers to 
the measurement of narrow abilities within broad ability factors.  Because many 
intelligence tests include ability scores constructed from two or more subtests, it is 
critical to ensure that these subtests measure different narrow abilities to make certain 
that they adequately assess the broad ability they were intended to measure.  For instance, 
inductive and deductive reasoning are part of the fluid intelligence construct.  If a test 
battery includes two fluid intelligence measures, but both measure inductive reasoning, 
they may not adequately represent the fluid intelligence construct.  Cross-battery 
assessment guides advocate for broad abilities to be assessed by two subtests measuring 
different narrow abilities.  In contrast to broad ability classification, the classification of 
subtests into narrow abilities appears to be heavily based in evidence derived from expert 
consensus studies (e.g. McGrew, 1997; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998).  These consensus 
studies frequently involve asking experts in CHC theory to categorize subtests by reading 
task descriptions and CHC ability definitions.  Participants select which definition applies 
to a description, and researchers calculate interrater reliability using a percentage of 
agreement among participants. 
Cross-Battery Assessment Guiding Principles   
Effective cross-battery assessment requires clinicians to follow six guiding 
principles that allow for the gathering of psychometrically and theoretically sound results 
(Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  First, clinicians should select an intelligence battery 
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that addresses referral concerns. Examples of frequently used batteries include the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Fourth Edition (WISC-IV), the Woodcock-
Johnson Psychoeducational Assessment Battery – Third Edition (WJ-III Cog), or the 
Stanford Binet – Fifth Edition (SB-V).  Second, clinicians should use subtests from a 
single battery to represent CHC abilities whenever possible.  This allows for results to be 
derived from actual norming data.  Third, clinicians should use subtests that have been 
classified into broad and narrow ability categories through acceptable methods.  Flanagan 
and colleagues (2007) suggest that factor analytic and expert consensus studies are 
appropriate types of data to use when selecting subtests.  Use of empirical data when 
selecting subtests allows clinicians to select relatively pure ability measures that assess 
different narrow abilities.  A minimum of two subtests are required to adequately assess a 
broad ability (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  Fourth, cross-battery assessment 
experts underscore that if a test battery does not include at least two indicators of a broad 
ability (that each measure different narrow abilities), then the battery should be 
supplemented by at least two indicators of a broad ability from another battery (Flanagan, 
Ortiz & Alfonso).  Fifth, when a battery does have to be supplemented with other tests, it 
is important to select subtests from a battery that has been developed and normed in close 
proximity to the core battery.  This principle is designed to guard against the “Flynn 
effect” or the finding that individuals tend to score higher on test batteries with older 
norms (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  Finally, the last principle of cross-battery 
assessment warns clinicians to use the smallest number of batteries necessary to minimize 
extraneous variance due to differences in characteristics of different norming samples. 
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Interpretation of Cross-Battery Assessments 
Because cross-battery assessment often requires a reorganization of test 
constructs, it also requires the use of alternative procedures in order to interpret examinee 
performance from a CHC framework (e.g. Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  CHC 
proponents stress that the interpretation of cross-battery assessment data begins with an 
assumption that examinee performance falls within the normal range of functioning (i.e. 
+/- one standard deviation from the normative mean) in order to avoid a predisposition to 
see areas of disability in test data.  Such a stance is similar to the estabilishment of a null 
hypothesis in statistical procedures, and is important in avoiding a bias to see disability 
where one does not exist.  Hypotheses are then created from an understanding of referral 
questions, using research as a means of hypothesis generation.  For instance, some 
research suggests that broad abilities may demonstrate important effects on academic 
achievement (e.g. Evans, Floyd, McGrew, & LeForgee, 2002; Flanagan, 2000; Floyd, 
Evans & McGrew, 2003).  Therefore, if an examinee is referred for reading difficulties, 
assessment should naturally focus on abilities that are empirically supported to be 
important to the reading process.  Once abilities have been targeted for assessment, 
clinicians can begin to construct an appropriate test battery.  After scoring all 
administered tests, the examiner can begin to make normative comparisons. 
 Cross-battery assessment guidebooks (e.g. Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007) 
typically emphasize the interpretation of broad, stratum II abilities.  Broad abilities can be 
interpreted so long as they 1) are represented by at least two subtests that measure two 
different narrow abilities and 2) reflect a unitary construct (i.e. operationally determined 
by the lack of statistical significance between two or more subtest scores).   If all broad 
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abilities are interpretable, then it is possible to determine whether findings support 
assessment hypotheses.  If a broad ability does not appear interpretable, then it may be 
necessary to gather additional data by administering a second subtest that measures the 
same narrow ability as the lower score in the construct (important when determining if 
the score is indeed a deficit).  More data on an uninterpretable broad ability is necessary 
when the ability is central to the referral question and one of its narrow abilities falls 
below normal limits.   
  
The Purpose of the Study 
 With an understanding of cross-battery interpretation procedures, it is possible to 
see that the classification of subtests into broad and narrow ability categories are both 
critical foundations of cross-battery assessment (i.e., Pillar II and III).  However, the 
methods used to classify subtests into broad and narrow ability categories often vary.  
Both methods are associated with limitations.  Broad ability classifications tend to be 
made using factor analysis.  The use of factor analysis is limited when making narrow 
ability classifications because such a study would be extremely large, requiring a large 
sample size and numerous cognitive batteries.  As an alternative, researchers have made 
narrow ability classifications by using expert consensus methods that rely on task 
analysis.  Task analysis may confound observable demands such as task presentations 
and response requirements, with unobservable demands like examinees’ use of cognitive 
abilities and mental processes.  It may also be difficult to determine the most important 
cognitive ability measured by a subtest through task analysis (Frisby & Parkin, 2007).   
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 Because “a proper multivariate study of both narrow and broad characteristics of 
all tests would be a daunting task” (Phelps, McGrew, Kopitk & Ford, 2005, p. 69), more 
investigation is needed to determine the viability of using task analysis to classify 
subtests into narrow abilities.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate similarities and 
differences in the category outcomes that result from these two data types (task data and 
ability data) to ascertain whether task analytic methods can provide results similar to an 
ability analysis.  It uses a group of six subtests previously classified as measuring narrow 
abilities subsumed by fluid intelligence (Gf) to compare similarities and contrast 
differences in the results of a an ability based analysis and a task analysis. 
Currently, all major studies that attempt to classify subtests into broad abilities 
use a “battery-focused approach.” In this approach, a major intelligence battery is 
analyzed in terms of its fit with CHC factors, or joint analyzed with the Woodcock 
Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to provide markers for broad ability factors.  To date, 
few studies have attempted an “ability-focused approach” where subtests from more than 
one or two batteries that are hypothesized to measure the same broad ability are subjected 
to confirmatory factor analytic methods.  One reason may be that it would require the 
administration of more than two cognitive batteries, and such data is not readily available 
for analysis.  Being much narrower in scope than past research, such a study may better 
validate narrow abilities measured by subtests from multiple test batteries.  
The results of such a confirmatory factor analysis would serve as a standard from 
which to compare task analytic results of narrow ability classifications.  If task analytic 
results appeared similar to ability-analysis results, it would add to the viability of using 
task analysis to make narrow ability classifications.  To date, because most task analytic 
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studies involve the use of measures of consensus, the present study uses an alternative 
methodology to increase the level of empiricism associated with task analysis.  Cluster 
analysis is used to analyze task demands because its purpose is to make classifications 
based on similarities among observations (Hair & Black, 2000).  Practitioners trained in 
intelligence testing provide data on the degree of similarity they perceive in the task 
demands of cognitive tests.  This similarity data is subjected to cluster analytic methods 
and the cluster membership of subtests used in the factor analysis is tracked as clusters 
become more and more homogenous.   
An understanding of whether these two data types lead to the same conclusions 
can provide practioners with more security in relying on the current knowledge base 
when interpreting broad and narrow cognitive ability measures.  Similarly, it will allow 
researchers to better understand the relationship between the task demands of a cognitive 
task and the abilites it may measure. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
History of Factor Analytic Theories of Intelligence and the Development of CHC Theory 
 Pioneered by Charles Spearman (1904), factor analysis is a statistical technique 
that partitions variance between variables (or mental tests in his research) into three 
different components: 1) common variance or variance shared with other variables, 2) 
specific variance, or variance that is not shared with other variables, and 3) error 
variance, or unreliable random variance (Bryant & Yarnold, 1995).  As a result of his 
factor analytic studies, Spearman (1927) posited a two-factor theory of intelligence 
(Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002).  Spearman’s two-factor theory considered variance common 
to all tests as “g” or a general factor of intelligence.  He defined “g” as a type of mental 
energy available for problem-solving (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2002; Sattler, 2001; Spearman, 
1927). Variance unique to a test or cognitive task was considered to be a specific ability 
(as opposed to the general ability).  Through factor analysis, variance that was unique to 
certain types of task, but not all tasks, was identified as “group factors.” (Cohen & 
Swerdlik). 
 Spearman’s work, and the identification of group factors, was a catalyst for the 
creation of “multifactor” theories of intelligence.  Two multifactor theories, Cattell and 
Horn’s Gf-Gc theory (Cattell, 1963; Horn, 1998; Sattler, 2001), and John Carroll’s Three 
Stratum Theory of Abilities (Carroll, 1993) form the foundation of CHC theory 
(McGrew, 1997).  Raymond B. Cattell, a student of Spearman’s, began to describe his 
theory in the first half of the 20th century (Jensen, 1998).  Gf-Gc theory originally 
described two factors: fluid intelligence and crystalized intelligence.  Fluid intelligence 
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refered to non-verbal, tests of mental power that did not depend on exposure to cultural 
information.  Alternatively, crystalized intelligence represented acquired skills and 
knowledge that are dependent on exposure to cultural information (Sattler, 2001).  Cattell 
and Horn later identfied other factors to describe the structure of intelligence after 
applying factor analysis to large datasets of diverse cognitive tasks (Horn, 1998, Jensen, 
1998; Sattler, 2001).   
It is important to note that Cattell and Horn’s Gf-Gc theory does not outline a 
general ability factor (McGrew, 1997; Jensen, 1998).  At the origin of the theory, when it 
only included two factors, a lack of a “g” factor was due to mathematical constraints 
(Jensen).  However, even after the inclusion of other broad factors into the theory, Horn 
and Noll (1997) maintained that the structure of intelligence did not include a general 
factor.  They stressed that different abilities displayed different rates of development and 
developmental declines, and also varied in their neurological functioning and level of 
heritability.  Due to these different ability characteristics, Horn and Noll (1997) stressed 
that inclusion of a general ability factor did not adequately explain the structure of 
intelligence.  
Carroll’s (1993) Three Stratum Theory of Cognitive Abilities, a second basis for 
CHC theory, was derived from the reanalysis of over 460 data sets and ultimately 
presents evidence for three hierarchically-arranged strata of abilities.  As a testament to 
the importance of Carroll’s work, McGrew (1997) suggests that “all scholars, test 
developers, and users of intelligence tests need to become familiar with Carroll’s treatise 
on the factors of human abilities” (p. 151).  Carroll (1997) indicated that his theory bears 
resemblence to earlier multifactor theories of cognitive abilities because he used many of 
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the same datasets in his analyses.  He described his theory as a map of a large number of 
abilities, where their collective relationships can be derived by classifying them into 
strata of narrow, broad and general ability.  The general factor, “g” represents the highest, 
third stratum in the hierarchy.  Carroll’s stratum II, broad factors included “abilities in the 
domain of,” language, reasoning, memory and learning, visual perception, auditory 
reception, idea production, cognitive speed, knowledge and achievement, and 
micellaneous domains of ability, such as sensory and attentional abilities. 
 Gf-Gc Theory and Three-Stratum Theory form the basis of CHC theory 
(McGrew, 1997; Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  There is much in common between 
these theories.  Neverthelss, they vary in their interpretation of a number of abilities.  
McGrew (1997) reports differences between the two theories to include the existence of a 
third stratum or, “g” factor, and the classification of a number of traditional academic 
and memory abilities.  He used subtests from the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive 
Abilities – Revised (WJ-R Cog; Woodcock & Johnson, 1989) to provide data for four 
models that he subjected to confirmatory factor analysis.  McGrew designed model one to 
encompass Carroll’s model, and it included six factors: 1) combined associative memory 
and memory span; 2) combined crystalized intelligence and reading/writing; 3) combined 
fluid reasoning and quantitative knowledge; 4) visual-spatial processing; 5) perceptual 
speeding and 6) phonetic coding, with a dual-loading on crystalized intelligence.  His 
second model removed the dualing loading of the phonetic tests, and separated 
associative memory from memory span.  McGrew’s third model also separated reading 
and writing from crystalized intelligence.  Finally, model four separated quantitative 
knowledge and fluid reasoning.  Models 3 and 4 resulted in relatively equivalent fit 
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statistics.  However, McGrew noted that fluid intelligence and quantitative knowledge 
expressed distinct dvelopmental growth curves, which he interpreted as evidence 
indicative of separate constructs.  As a result, he considered model 4 to be a more 
appropriate integration of the two theories. 
 The resultant CHC theory includes 10 broad abilities and over 70 narrow abilities.  
As outlined by Flanagan, Ortiz and Alfonso (2007), the broad abilities include: 
 Fluid intelligence (Gf) represents mental operations used in novel tasks that 
cannot be performed with any degree of automaticity.  Novel tasks include stimuli or 
require methods of completion that examinees have generally lacked exposure to, or may 
never have performed before, where the fundaments are easy to understand by the widest 
range of cultural groups (e.g., pictures, abstract shapes and symbols).  These tasks 
involve forming and/or recognizing concepts, identifying relationships, drawing out 
inferences, understanding implications and problem-solving; 
 Crystallized intelligence (Gc) refers to an individual’s acquired knowledge of 
their dominant culture.  These cognitive abilities are primarily verbal or language-based 
in nature; 
 Quantitative knowledge (Gq) represents acquired quantitative knowledge.  
Specifically, it involves the application and comprehension of mathematical concepts; 
 Reading/Writing ability (Grw) reflects a knowledge bank that includes reading 
and writing skills required for the expression of thought via writing and the 
comprehension of language through the written word; 
 Short-term memory (Gsm) requires the maintenance of information in immediate 
awareness and using it within a few seconds; 
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 Visual processing (Gv) represents the ability to visualize, manipulate, analyze and 
synthesize visual patterns, stimuli or information. 
 Auditory processing (Ga) involves the perception of sound patterns, specifically 
the ability to analyze, synthesize and manipulate auditory stimuli, and especially 
discriminating subtle sounds, such as when under distraction; 
 Long-term storage and retrieval (Glr) represents the cognitive ability to store 
information in long-term memory and to retrieve it at a later time through association; 
 Processing speed (Gs) involves the rapid, fluid performance of simple, clerical-
type tasks, especially when under pressure to maintain attention and concentration; 
 Decision/Reaction time/Correct decision speed (Gt) involves the ability to make 
immediate decisions or react to quickly changing stimuli.     
 Major efforts in cross-battery assessment literature have attempted to apply CHC 
theory to the classification of subtests from major test batteries. Thus, critical literature 
associated with cross-battery assessment revolves around studies classifying subtests 
from test batteries into broad and narrow ability factors, as outlined by CHC theory.  
These studies include single battery and joint battery factor analyses and expert 
consensus studies.  
Applying CHC Theory to Major Cognitive Batteries Through Factor Analysis 
CHC theory has been a major influence in modern day test development, starting 
with the Woodcock-Johnson III (WJ-III Cog; McGrew & Woodcock, 2001). The WJ-III 
Cog standardization sample provides the largest database of support for CHC theory from 
one source (McGrew & Woodcock, 2001).  Other modern tests, including the Stanford 
Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB-IV; Roid, 2003), the Differential Abilities 
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Scale, Second Edition (DAS-II; Elliot, 2007) and the Kaufman Assessment Battery for 
Children, Second Edition (KABC-II; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), have also been based 
on the CHC ability taxonomy. 
Much of the research validating the use of the CHC taxonomy for the 
interpretation of intelligence scores come from both single battery confirmatory factor 
analyses and joint confirmatory analyses including more than one intelligence battery 
(Flanagan, McGrew & Ortiz, 2000).  Single battery confirmatory factor analyses are 
often conducted by independent researchers as a way of assessing whether alternative 
factor structures fit a battery better than the one indicated by a test’s authors.  They may 
also be included in test manuals as a way of confirming content validity (e.g., Hammill, 
1998; Roid, 2003).  Though single battery analyses are important, often the number of 
subtests in single battery analyses proves insufficient to allow all the abilities tapped by 
subtests to emerge during analysis (Woodcock, 1990; Flanagan & McGrew, 1998).  
Including more than one battery in a factor analysis provides more factor indicators, and 
allows subtests to load on constructs defined theoretically.  Thus, as an alternative 
method for investigating a test battery’s factor structure and identifying the abilities 
measured by subtests, researchers have conducted confirmatory factor analyses on a 
number of major test batteries by using WJ-III Cog subtests as marker variables for CHC 
Stratum II abilities (Flanagan & McGrew, 1998; Keith, Kranzler & Flangan, 2001; 
Phelps, McGrew, Knopik & Ford, 2005; Sanders et. al., 2007; Tusing & Ford, 2004; 
Woodcock, 1990).  Both methods demonstrate the importance of CHC theory when 
interpreting test data, and also highlight tests that measure fluid intelligence as a Stratum 
II ability. 
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Single Battery Confirmatory Factor Analyses.   Recent independent confirmatory 
factor analyses have demonstrated that CHC theory may actually provide a better, more 
interpretable structure for scores from a number of IQ test batteries (Keith et. al., 2006; 
Kranzler & Keith, 1999).  Validity studies in the WISC-IV manual (Wechsler, 2003) 
suggest that WISC-IV subtests measure “g” and subsequently, Verbal Comprehension 
(VCI), Perceptual Reasoning (PRI), Working Memory (WMI) and Processing Speed 
(PSI) factors.  However, the manual’s four factor structure has been contested by 
independent analyses endorsing a CHC hierarchy that requires modification to traditional 
WISC-IV interpretation (Keith et al., 2006).  For instance, the PRI factor may not 
actually reflect a unitary construct.  Instead it appears to consist of a mix of both fluid 
intelligence (Gf) and visual processing (Gv) abilities. Block Design and Picture 
Completion subtests appear to load on visual processing, while Matrix Reasoning and 
Picture Concept subtests load on fluid reasoning.  Keith and colleagues demonstrated that 
a model including the WISC-IV PRI factor reflects a poorer fit to the standardization data 
compared to a model with a separte fluid reasoning and visual-spatial processing factor 
(Keith et al., 2006, p. 117). Additionally, the researchers suggest that the Arithmetic 
subtest appears to be a primary measure of fluid intelligence, while also acknowledging 
that the subtest likely measures a complex set of abilities (p. 118). 
 Kranzler and Keith’s (1999) confirmatory factor analysis suggests that the 
Cognitive Assessment System (CAS) may contain similar mixed constructs.  Based on 
Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Sequential (PASS) theory (Naglieri & Das, 
1997), the CAS stresses the importance of three types of cognitive abilities or systems 
when processing information: a) planning involves the formation, selection and 
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monitoring of strategies and plans of action; b) attention represents the ability to allocate 
cognitive resources and effort to tasks; c) information processing, comprised of 
simultaneous and successive processing abilities, encompasses the acquisition, storage 
and retrieval of information from the environment; lastly.  While initial analyses reported 
in the CAS manual (Naglieri & Das, 1997) seem to suggest that the PASS structure 
describes CAS subtests well, Kranzler and Keith’s analysis suggests that a hierarchical 
model may be a better fit.  Similar to the WISC-IV’s PRI construct, the CAS 
simultaneous processing ability (i.e. Nonverbal Matrices, Verbal Spatial Relations and 
Figural Memory) may actually represent a complex mix of Gf and Gv CHC Factors 
(Kranzler & Keith, 1999).   
 Other intelligence batteries include confirmatory factor analyses to confirm CHC 
theory as part of their validity evidence, including the Stanford-Binet, Fifth Edition (SB-
V; Roid, 2003) and the Woodcock–Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Abilities (Woodcock, 
McGrew, & Mather, 2001).  The SB-V measures five of the ten CHC broad abilities: 
fluid intelligence, quantitative reasoning, crystallized knowledge, short-term memory and 
visual processing.  This five-factor model was judged to be the best fit during a series of 
confirmatory factor analyses. The authors of the WJ-III cognitive battery also endorsed a 
CHC model for their test (Woodcock, McGrew & Mather, 2001).  Their data suggest that 
the WJ-III Cog measures Gc, Gq, Glr, Gv, Ga, Gf, Gs and Gsm abilities.  It is important 
to note that most of the subtests included in the WJ-III cognitive battery appear to be 
relatively pure measures of their respective abilities, and thus, the WJ-III Cog appears to 
be free from extraneous, construct irrelevant variance.  Additionally, it appears that this 
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factor structure is supported across age groups in the norm sample (Taub & McGrew, 
2004).  
Joint-Battery Confirmatory Factory Analysis.  Due to a limited number of 
subtests contained in test batteries, single battery confirmatory studies may not be able to 
ascertain the usefulness of CHC theory for the interpretation of a single battery.  
McGrew, Flanagan and Ortiz (2000) provide an example of the limitations of single 
battery factor analysis based on Woodcock’s (1990) discussion of the WJ-R and the 
WISC-R.  Woodcock’s conclusions not only demonstrate the usefulness of CHC theory, 
but stress the critical importance of content validity in the construction of tests.  Factor 
analysis of the WISC-R suggests that it contains Verbal Comprehension (VC), Perceptual 
Organization (PO) and Freedom-From-Distractibility (FFD) factors.  While VC and PO 
appear to measure Gc and Gv abilities respectively, FFD does not appear to be associated 
with any type of Gf-Gc ability.  Joint factor analysis of the WISC-R with the WJ-R 
demonstrates that the FFD factor does not emerge when its subtests are allowed to load 
on factors with subtests from the WJ-R.  Because inclusion of WJ-R subtests provides 
more indicators for the detection of abilities measured in the WISC-R, rather than loading 
together on one factor, FFD subtests load on factors that appear to represent short-term 
memory (Gsm), quantitative knowledge (Gq) and processing speed (Gs).  As a result, 
some scholars conclude that the FFD factor likely represents “the fallout from the weak 
substantive or theoretical foundation of the Wechsler Scales” (Flanagan, McGrew & 
Ortiz, 2000, p. 72).   
Joint factor analytic studies typically use the Woodcock Johnson series of 
cognitive tests co-analyzed alongside a target battery.  Researchers have reported 
 24
analyses of Woodcock subtests with the Stanford-Binet, Fourth Edition (Thorndike, 
Hagen & Sattler, 1986), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children – Revised (1974) and the Kaufman-Assessment Battery for Children 
(Kaufman, 1983; Woodcock, 1990), the Detriot Test of Learning Aptitude, Third Edition 
(DTLA-3; McGhee, 1993), the Detriot Test of Learning Aptitude – Adult (DTLA-A; 
Hammell & Bryant, 1991; Buckholt, McGhee & Ehrler, 2001), the Kaufman Adult and 
Adolescent Intelligence Test (KAIT; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993; McGrew & Flanagan, 
1998), the Cognitive Assessment System (CAS; Naglieri, & Das, 1997; Keith, Kranzler & 
Flanagan, 2001) and the Differential Ability Scales (DAS; Elliot, 1990; Sanders, 
McIntosh, Dunham, Rothlisberg & Finch, 2007).  All studies indicate that CHC theory 
can be used in the interpretation of these intelligence tests.  Also endorsed by McGrew 
(1997), Woodcock (1990) used a rating system to classify subtests as strong, moderate or 
mixed measures of broad abilities.  Strong subtests demonstrated a factor loading greater 
than .500 and a secondary factor loading that was less than one-half of the primary 
loading.  Moderate subtests were classified with two different criteria: a) subtests loading 
on a primary factor under .500 and also loaded on a second factor with a loading that was 
less than one-half of the primary loading, or b) subtests loading with any value on a 
primary factor that also measured a secondary factor with a loading between one-half and 
seven-tenths of the primary loading.  Woodcock labeled subtests with a secondary 
loading greater than seven-tenths of a primary loading as “mixed,” as it can be difficult to 
distinguish a primary factor loading from these subtests.   
Research across batteries consistently demonstrates that Woodcock-Johnson 
subtests Analysis-Synthesis and Concept Formation appear to be strong measures of fluid 
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intelligence (i.e., Gf) and underscores their usefulness as markers for the Gf broad ability.  
In Woodcock’s analyses of the WJ-R (1990), these subtests demonstrated loadings of 
.586 and .682 on a Gf factor.  Similarly, as part of the WJ-III Cog, Analysis-Synthesis and 
Concept Formation demonstrated loadings of .72 and .73 when analyzed with the DAS 
(Sanders, McIntosh, Dunham, Rothlisberg & Finch, 2007) and comparable loadings when 
analyzed with the CAS (Keith, Kranzler & Flanagan, 2001).  Additionally, both subtests 
loaded in the .60’s when analyzed with subtests from the WISC-III (Phelps, McGrew, 
Knopik & Ford, 2005). 
Due to Analysis-Synthesis’ and Concept Formation’s strong Gf loadings, subtests 
that load with them in joint analyses are also important to note as measures of fluid 
intelligence.  Woodcock (1990) demonstrated that the SB-IV’s Matrices subtest loaded 
with these subtests (.609) and validity data for the Stanford-Binet, Fifth Edition (Roid, 
2003) indicates that its Nonverbal Fluid Reasoning and Verbal Fluid Reasoning subtests 
demonstrated strong loadings with Analysis-Synthesis.  KAIT subtests Logical Steps and 
Mystery Codes demonstrated factor loadings in the .90s with these subtests (Flanagan & 
McGrew, 1998) and Keith and colleagues (2001) CAS/WJ-III Cog analysis indicated that 
the WJ-III’s Numerical Reasoning subtest loads highly (.74) on a Gf factor.  Phelps et. al 
(2005), who included WJ-III supplemental tests in their analyses, demonstrated that 
Number Matrices, Number Series and Applied Problems can be considered tests of Gf as 
well.  Sanders et al. (2007) demonstrated that DAS subtests Matrices and Sequential and 
Quantitative Reasoning measure aspects of fluid intelligence, both demonstrating 
loadings in the .70s with Concept Formation/Analysis-Synthesis. 
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Other subtests appear to be more mixed measures of fluid intelligence.  
Woodcock’s (1990) analyses with the WJ and WJ-R demonstrated that Spatial Relations 
appears to be a moderate measure.  Verbal Analogies appears to be a mixed measure with 
a moderate loading on Gf and Gc.  The DTLA subtest Symbolic Relations appears to load 
on Gf, Gq and Ga (Buckhalt, McGhee & Ehrler, 2001).  Phelps et. al (2005) 
demonstrated that the WJ-III Planning subtest also appears to be a moderate measure of 
fluid intelligence.  
Narrow Ability Measures 
 Because narrow abilities represent the building blocks of composite scores under 
the cross-battery assessment model, it is critical to understand which narrow abilities 
subtests may measure.  While factor analytic studies like those mentioned earlier can 
identify a battery’s structure and highlight subtests that measure different broad abilities, 
they are unable to identify more specific abilities assessed by subtests with few 
exceptions.  This inability is primarily due to difficulty administering enough subtests to 
a large enough sample of examinees in order to have multiple indicators of a narrow 
ability.  Current studies would have to greatly increase both the number of tests 
adminstered to participants and also the number of participants included in their sample 
size. 
 Identifying Narrow Abilities Through Factor Analysis.  A small number of the 
reviewed joint factor analysis studies contained enough ability indicators to provide 
evidence narrow ability classifications for some fluid intelligence subtests’ narrow ability 
classifications.  Flanagan and McGrew (1998) demonstrated that the fluid intelligence 
factor that emerges in WJ-III Cog/KAIT joint analysis may actually represent two narrow 
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abilities, general sequential reasoning (including Analysis-Synthesis and Logical Steps) 
and induction (Concept Formation and Mystery Codes).  Phelps and colleagues (2005) 
also demonstrated WJ-III Cog and WISC-III fluid intelligence subtests may represent 
narrow ability measures as well.  After creating a place holder factor that included WJ-III 
Cog’s Analysis-Synthesis and Concept Formation subtests, a quantitative reasoning 
narrow ability emerged, loading on fluid intelligence and including Planning, Number 
Matrices, Number Series and Applied Problems subtests from the WJ-III Supplemental 
and Achievement tests.  McGrew and Woodcock (2001) present a three-stratum model 
for the WJ-III battery which includes both cognitive and achievement tests.  They 
highlight a number of narrow abilities in the model, including the Gf narrow ability, 
Quantitiatve Reasoning (RQ).  Their analyses suggest that subtests such as Analysis-
Synthesis, Applied Problems and Quantitaitve Concepts may load on an RQ factor. 
Task Analytic Methods in Subtest Classification 
Because of the high number of participants and ability indicators required to 
identify narrow abilities through factor analysis, researchers have used other methods to 
understand the abilities tapped by cognitive subtests.  Task analysis involves the 
comparison of subtests’ functional task demands: their mode of stimuli input and 
response output, as well as any required strategies and cognitive processes that are 
necessary for successful completion of their test items.  Clinicians may use task analysis 
to understand examinee cognitive strengths and weaknesses, while researchers may use it 
to label factors common among a number of subtests.   
Spearman engaged in task analysis to provide context to the results of factor 
analytic studies by considering the similarities between what he considered high g-
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loaded, versus low g-loaded tests (Jensen, 1998). From his comparisons, Spearman 
outlined three “laws of noegenesis” or the “production of new knowledge, or mental 
content from sensory or cognitive experience” (Jensen, 1998, p. 35).  As reported by 
Jensen, Spearman labeled these laws apprehension of experience, eduction of relations 
and eduction of correlates.  To Spearman, apprehension of experience refered to an 
awareness of perceiving the characteristics of stimuli.  Eduction of relations expressed 
the tendency for the presentation of two or more stimuli (called “fundaments”) to “draw 
out” an appropriate comparison between them.  For instance, upon presention of the word 
stimuli “red-blue”, the examinee would educe the relationship “color.”  Spearman’s 
eduction of correlates expressed that the presentation of a fundament and a relationship 
together would result in the tendency to make correlates of that relationship salient.  
Presentation of the fundament “small” along with the relationship “opposite” would 
prompt the examinee to educe a correlate of these concepts and result in the response 
“big.”  Spearman suggested that tasks with a high “g”-loading would be tasks that 
require the eduction of relations and the eduction of correlates.   
Though Spearman described some characteristics of items that may better 
measure “g” through the task analysis process, Jensen (1998) stressed that “g” cannot be 
described by the specific functional requirements of a test.  Results from diverse types of 
cognitive tests generally “rank order persons in much the say way, despite the tests’ often 
vastly different appearance in information content and form of response” (Jensen, 1992, 
p. 175).  This tendency defines Spearman’s theorem of the indifference of the indicator 
(Jensen, 1992; 1998), a principle evident within modern test batteries.  For instance, 
within the WISC-IV, Block Design, a measure of examinees’ ability to replicate puzzles 
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with colored blocks, and Vocabulary a measure of the ability to supply definitions to 
words, correlate highly with the FSIQ (.70 and .79 respectively).  However, their 
correlation with each other is .48 (Wechsler, 2003b).  These tests have very different task 
demands, and a task analysis may suggest that they measure different constructs, 
nevertheless, each test correlates very highly with a general factor. 
Though the indifference of the indicator emphasizes a common construct 
measured across cognitive tasks, group factors can be described in terms of “the obvious 
characteristics of the kinds of tests that load on them (such as verbal, numerical, spatial 
visualization, memory, mechanical…)” (Jensen, 1998 p. 91).  This process is used to 
define and label factors based on the factor loadings of ability tests.  As Jensen has 
suggested, it is important when interpreting factor analytic results of broad abilities.  
Thus, though the concept of “g” does not highlight the importance of task analysis, task 
analysis is critcal when understanding group factors, or CHC broad ability factors.   
Clinicians frequently engage in task analysis to understand examinee performance 
on cognitive subtests and to develop hypotheses of cognitive strengths and weaknesses.  
To facilitate this process, test developers often publish test supplements that discuss 
potential reasons for differences in performance.  Numerous books and supplementals are 
written to aid clinicians in how to interpret examinee scores, analyze examinee 
performance and use test batteries appropriately with diverse types of populations (e.g., 
see Flanagan & Kaufman, 2004; Schrank & Flanagan, 2003).  Schrank and Flanagan 
(2003) stress the importance of understanding task demands when understanding subtest 
scores: 
 “Examiners should pay particular attention to the description of task demands 
across  test or subtest items.  It is important to consider the multidimensional nature of 
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the task requirements.  For example, a cancellation task...involves or requires several 
abilities and processes including sustained attention, processing, motoric speed, and 
executive functioning,. . . .  Consider the task demands of this test [a cancellation task].  
The examinee needs to scan a page of items heavily laden with little pictures (soccer 
balls, dogs, tea cups) and is required to locate and mark a repeating pattern (ball 
followed by a dog) in rows of pictures that are purposely designed to be visually ‘busy.’  
This test has a 3 minute time limit.” (p. 51, 68). 
 
 Analyzing task demands allows practitioners to regroup subtests in attempt to 
discover areas in which examinees may show strengths and/or deficits.  Interpretations of 
subtests can appear “fairly similar, but [diverge] in accordance with each author's 
personal orientation” (Kaufman, 1994, p. 49).  Different theories may suggest that 
subtests are similar or different from each other based on the task demands they impose 
on the examinee.  As Kaufman (1994) demonstrates, subtests may be grouped based upon 
their sensitivity to attention and concentration, motor demands, visual organization, lack 
of motor coordination, or any other kind of functional requirement.  In all likelihood the 
number of variations and combinations of subtest task demands has no limit.  
History of Task Analysis in Test Interpretation 
 Frisby and Parkin (2007) argue that task analysis represents a rational, but 
subjective process.  During the early years of test development and interpretation, 
subtests were selected for inclusion into test batteries through an “armchair” intuitive 
analysis of similarities and differences in their functional demands.  Individually, 
examiners considered subtest characteristics and selectively grouped together tests that 
appeared similar.  For instance, Wechsler originally organized his test battery 
dichotomously “based on intuitive and rational considerations” (Kaufman, 1979, p. 130).  
Subtests requiring verbal responses from examinees were considered to be verbal in 
nature, while those requiring pointing or other types of motor responses were considered 
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more performance oriented (Kaufman, 1979; Kaufman, 1994; Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 
2002).  However, as Kaufman notes, Wechsler expected that “the abilities represented in 
the tests may also be meaningfully classified in other ways” (Wechsler, 1974, p. 9).  As 
he predicted, researchers and scholars have outlined numerous ways to organize cognitive 
subtests (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2002).  Similar to Wechsler's original methods, most 
of these organizational schemes are rational analyses of subtests' task demands. 
 Reorganization of the Wechsler Scales.  Throughout their history, the Wechsler 
scales have been reorganized by numerous scholars and researchers, including Rapaport 
and colleagues (Rapaport, Gill & Schafer, 1945), Bannatyne (1971), and Kaufman 
(1979).  Rapaport and colleagues divided the Wechsler-Bellevue (W-B) scale into verbal 
and performance halves, and further subdivided those categories based on their clinical 
experience administering those tests (Kaufman).  Within the verbal category, they 
stressed that Comprehension, Information and Similarities required significant verbal 
ability, while Arithmetic and Digit Span tapped attention and concentration abilities.  
They divided the performance category into tasks that were more (Block Design, Object 
Assembly, Digit-Symbol Coding), or less dependent on motor skills. 
 Bannatyne’s (1979) reorganization of the original WISC had both similarities and 
differences compared to Rapaport’s categorization.  Similar to Rapaport, Bannatyne 
outlined a verbal ability category (Similarities, Vocabulary and Comprehension), though 
his method of categorization differed from Rapaport regarding other subtests.  Bannatyne 
stressed that Information, Vocabulary and Arithmetic reflected an acquired knowledge 
category.  Picture Completion, Block Design and Object Assembly were considered 
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measures of spatial ability, while Arithmetic, Digit Span, and Coding subtests reflected 
sequencing skills.  
Kaufman (1979) provides a detailed discussion of ‘profile attack’ via rational 
analysis by building, and expanding on these clinicians’ numerous methods of 
categorization.  Kaufman (1979, Table 3-1) suggested a number of recategorizations of 
WISC-R subtests, some based on a multifactor theory of intelligence outlined by 
Guilford, and others derived from rational interpretation.  He asserted that the 
Performance Scale consisted almost exclusively of Guilford's evaluation operation with 
figural content.  Alternatively, WISC-R verbal subtests were mainly comprised of 
semantic content, with only the Comprehension subtest requiring evaluative processes 
from the examinee.  Subtests that make up the Freedom from Distractibility Index 
(Arithmetic, Digit Span and Coding) all utilized symbolic content.   
 Kaufman (1979) outlined a number of additional intuitive or theoretical subtest 
categorizing methods for the WISC-R.  They are not associated with any of the particular 
classification schemes previously discussed, but nonetheless demonstrate alternative 
ways to consider patterns of high and low scores on intelligence test profiles.   
Patterns on the Verbal Scale included subtests requiring reasoning versus recall 
processes, subtests providing brief stimuli or long stimuli for the examinee, and subtests 
that require brief expressions in response from an examinee, or those that require lengthy 
verbal expressions.  
Reasoning vs. Recall Processes.  Similarities, Arithmetic, and Comprehension are 
verbal subtests that require reasoning, specifically problem-solving or the application of 
old, previously learned knowledge to novel situations.  Alternatively, Information, 
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Vocabulary, and Digit Span reflect subtests that merely require the retrieval of 
information stored in memory.  However, within these categories, subtests are still not 
necessarily homogenous in their task demands.  For instance, within the reasoning 
category, Similarities and Comprehension require verbal reasoning from examinees.  
Arithmetic, as the third subtest in the category, requires reasoning with numbers.  To 
complicate this category further, Arithmetic and Comprehension require reasoning in 
social situations.  Arithmetic uses mathematical word problems applied within real-life 
scenarios, while Comprehension requires reasoning around social norms.  To some 
clinicians, Similarities may not appear as social in its task demands because the nature of 
its responses are more abstract and involve a relationship between words or concepts.  
Subtests in the recall category are also not homogenous in their task demands.  
Specifically, Information and Vocabulary require examinees to use long-term memory 
stores, while performance on Digit Span is more dependent on short-term or working 
memory. 
 Length of Stimuli/Length of Response.  Verbal subtests can also be partitioned into 
categories based on the length of their stimuli, and the length of the response they require 
from the examinee (Kaufman, 1979).  Information, Arithmetic, and Comprehension use 
lengthy verbal statements as part of their task demands.  In contrast, considering that 
Similarities presents two words to the examinee, Vocabulary, one word, and Digit Span, 
a progressively longer series of numbers, their stimuli are relatively shorter.  When 
categorizing these subtests based on the length of response required from the examinee, 
Similarities, Vocabulary, and Comprehension are considered similar because all require 
lengthy expressions from the examinee.  Responses tend to be rationalizations, or 
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definitions.  Comparatively, Information, Arithmetic, and Digit Span require short 
answers such as a number, a specific response like a geographical location or historical 
figure, or the repetition of a string of numbers. 
Kaufman (1979) also delineates classification schemes for subtests on the WISC-
R's Performance scale.  Bannatyne's Spatial Ability is one of the category types Kaufman 
mentions, although cognitive styles, processing and stimuli type, and imitation/problem 
solving dichotomies are also subtest task demands that can divide Wechsler Performance 
subtests.  The WISC-R Performance scale also includes subtests that differ based on their 
problem solving requirements, the nature of their stimuli, and the mode of their response 
requirements (Kaufman).   
Cognitive Style.  Regarding cognitive styles, Kaufman suggests that the 
Wechsler's verbal scale consists of language tasks dominated by the brain's left 
hemisphere.  Subtests on the Performance scale can be split between right brain 
functioning, and those requiring an integration of tasks for the two hemispheres.  
Kaufman argues that Picture Completion and Object Assembly require holistic 
visualization for successful completion.  Other subtests on the scale (ie. Picture 
Arrangement, Block Design, Coding and Mazes) require more than just visual-spatial 
skills; they require considerable verbal instructions by the examiner, sequencing, or other 
analytic operations usually performed by the left side of the brain. 
 Processing and Stimuli Type. When analyzing task demands, Kaufman (1979) 
also makes distinctions between types of cognitive processing.  Successive processing 
features serial and sequential interpretation of test stimuli, meaning that task completion 
requires the ability to understand that parts of a task must occur in an order.  Picture 
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Arrangement, Coding, and Mazes represent subtests on the Performance scale that require 
examinees to sequentially engage with one part of stimuli at a time, be it the order of 
pictures, successive corridors in a maze, or a progression through a series of abstract 
shapes.  Simultaneous processing assumes that all stimuli in a test are being considered at 
the same time.  Accordingly, on the WISC Picture Completion, Block Design, and Object 
Assembly can be considered as subtests requiring simultaneous processing as part of their 
task demands.  Kaufman (1979) notes that the simultaneous group is identical to 
Bannatyne's Spatial category and is very similar to the subtests considered to be right 
brain oriented.  
Response Requirements.  Block Design and Coding require examinees to imitate 
and/or reproduce test stimuli as they complete items on the subtest.  Response 
requirements may also include tests that requiring pointing versus providing a verbal 
response. 
Problem-solving Style.  Performance subtests demand a range of problem solving 
sophistication from examinees.  Problem solving may range from deducing the missing 
part of a picture to sequencing a group of story boards to form a coherent story.  Some 
Performance tests consider of meaningful or concrete stimuli.  Picture Completion, 
Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly are subtests with identifiable (meaningful) 
stimuli that examinees likely have encountered in real life and are familiar with.  In 
contrast Block Design and Coding stimuli are more abstract in nature.  Note that this 
dichotomy can apply to certain subtests on the Verbal scale.  Kaufman (1979) suggests 
that if reasoning with abstract stimuli is a strength for an examinee, clinicians may 
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observe high Arithmetic and Digit Span scores, because numbers are also symbolic in 
nature.   
Examinee Response Mode.  Lastly, examinee response modes reflect another way 
to organize subtests on the Performance scale, similar to the scheme endorsed by 
Rapaport and his colleagues (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1945).  Block Design, Object 
Assembly, Coding, and Mazes reflect subtests that require visual-motor responses, while 
Picture Completion and Picture Arrangement reflect responses comprised of specific 
visual organizational patterns. 
Limitations with Rational Classifications.  The multiple classifications derived 
from these same set of tasks reflects an important limitation associated with the rational 
analysis of subtests.  Primarily, different aspects of a task may be more salient to 
clinicians depending on theoretical orientation.  For instance, clinicians have categorized 
Vocabulary to reflect verbal comprehension ability because it requires examinees to 
respond to short, verbal stimuli with long verbal responsese.  Clinicians have also 
categorized the subtest to reflect an acquired knowledge store because successful 
performance on the task requires access to long-term storage to retrieve word definitions.  
Though both abilities may be important in the completion of the task, it is difficult to 
know which ability may be the strongest influence on an examinee’s task performance. 
Task Analysis and Information Processing Theories 
 While early uses of task analysis represented efforts to increase the utility of 
subtest interpretation, more modern use of task analysis reflect an effort to apply models 
of information processing to cognitve assessment.  Information processing reflects the 
sequences of mental operations and their outcomes that occur while an individual is 
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engaged in a cognitive task (Sternberg, 1981).  Information procesing models often 
include components such as a sensory register, a temporary holding space for stimuli 
gathered from sense organs, short-term memory, limited capacity stores for information 
in immediate awareness, and long-term memory, relatively permanent storage of 
knowledge (Floyd, 2005).  Floyd stressed that an integration of information processing 
models with factor analytic research on cognitive abilities is necessary to a) increase 
collaboration between cognitive psychology and psychometric researchers, b) improve 
methods to gather evidence of validity for cognitive tests, c) facilitate the diagnosis  of 
learning disabilities, and d) explain reasons for individual variation on cognitive tasks 
with greater precision.  Task analysis represents a critical vehicle for this integration 
because it involves analyzing and describing characteristics of cognitive tasks.  
Atkinson and Shiffirin (1968) presented an initial model of information 
processing that is now considered the “granddaddy” of information processing research 
(Floyd, 2005).  Their model describes information or stimuli from the environment 
passing into awareness through a sensory register where it is stored only for a brief period 
of time.  If the information is not attended to it is lost.  Otherwise the information enters 
modality-specific short-term memory (e.g. auditory-verbal-linguistic, visual and touch-
related memory stores).  The use of storage strategies (such as reherasal) may transfer 
information from short-term to long-term memory or a store of acquired knowledge.  
This type of model inspired psychometric researchers to consider cognitive subtests from 
the perspective of the tasks they require of examinees and not exclusively by the abilities 
they may measure. 
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Carroll’s Task Coding Scheme 
 While Kaufman used theWechsler series of tests when describing constructs used 
to categorize tests during task analysis, Carroll (1976) created a categorization scheme to 
define subtests as cognitive tasks in order to integrate theories of cognitive processing 
with factor analytic studies.  He selected a sample of 74 cognitive tests included in the Kit 
of Reference Tests for Cognitive Factors (1963) that measured 24 different cognitive 
abilities.  In order to understand these subtests as tasks rather than as a measure of some 
type of ability, Carroll tried to ignore, or “lay aside, and be unbiased by, any knowledge 
[he] had of the empirically determined ‘factor structure’ of each test” (Carroll, 1976 p. 
37).   
 Carroll (1976; Floyd, 2005) outlined six characteristics useful in categorizing 
subtests as cognitive tasks.  He specified that subtests may differ based on 1) the types of 
stimuli presented at task outset, 2) the overt responses examinees must make at the end of 
the task, 3) the structure of the task, 4) operations and strategies used to complete the 
task, 5) temporal aspects (such as duration) of any required operations or strategies an 
examinee must use to complete the task, and 6) the memory storage involved in the task 
(see Carroll, 1976, Table 1, p. 38).  Each of these six broad classification schemes also 
has a number of criteria and sub-criteria.   
 Stimulus Materials.  Subtests may consist of different types of stimuli, such as 
tangible items like blocks, words, pictures, or verbal phrases.  Materials can also vary in 
the number of stimuli classes they use, their “completeness”, and their interpretability.  
Some types of subtests may consist solely of one type of stimuli, while others may have 
more types.  The WISC-IV's Vocabulary test allows the examinee to read a word and 
 39
hear it pronounced by the examiner, thus providing two classes of stimuli for input: 
visual and auditory.  By “completeness” Carroll accounts for subtests that may use 
planned interference as part of their task demands (i.e. progressively louder white noise 
to examinees to increase task difficulty in attending to target stimuli).  For example, the 
Auditory Attention test from the WJ-III Cog , a task that requires the examinee to point at 
a picture based on a word that they discriminate from progressively louder white-noise, 
represents an example of this stimulus characteristic.  Interpretability expresses that some 
subtest stimuli are unambiguous and immediately interpretable while other stimuli may 
be more ambiguous.  Ambiguous in this sense does not consider stimuli as necessarily 
difficult to categorize and understand, more accurately it refers to stimuli that could be 
coded into examinees cognitive processes in several different ways.  Other subtest stimuli 
may be anomalous and not immediately understood by examinees. 
 Examinee Responses.  Carroll considered examinees’ responses to test items from 
several perspectives.  They differ in the number and type of responses to be made, the 
mode of response, and the criterion that decides whether responses are deemed to be 
acceptable.  Subtests may require examinees to select one response from a list of choices, 
create their own response based on stimuli and required mental operations, produce as 
many responses as possible, or respond a specific number of times.  The method with 
which an examinee must produce a response may be through indicating a choice, 
producing a symbol or letter, writing a word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph (or even 
more), making a verbal response or creating a line or other type of drawing.  When 
considering what criteria subtests use to determine the acceptability of responses, Carroll 
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argued that answers could reflect numerous types of acceptability such as judgments or 
associations. 
 Test Structure. Carroll used the term “task structure” in referring to time-related 
aspects of subtests (Floyd, 2005).  For instance, many subtests may incorporate a time-
delay into their task structure, where examinees are exposed to stimuli at one time, and 
then required to use the stimuli at a later time.  In comparison, other subtests have a more 
“unitary” task structure, as they are not revisited at a later time. 
 Test Operations and Strategies.  Operations and strategies refer to elementary 
information processes required of examinees when they are engaged in a task (Floyd, 
2005).  The operations and/or strategies that examinees may use to complete subtests may 
differ based on the number of operations or strategies that are required to complete the 
task, the type of operation needed, whether the operation is explicitly specified during 
task instructions, and how critical a particular operation or strategy is for successful test 
completion.  Operations may also vary in the duration required to complete any particular 
cognitive task.  Carroll (1976, see Table 1, p. 38) delineated 20 types of operations that 
examinees may use during subtest completion.  These may include identifying 
similarities betweenstimuli, rotating a spatial configuration, storing items inmemory, 
constructing a hypothesis, or engaging in a specific visual search strategy. 
Temporal Aspects of Operation Strategies.  Operations employed during 
performance on a task may vary in duration based on task or individual examinee 
differences.  They may also terminate themselves, such as when they lead to a correct 
solution, or they may not be self-terminating, as when time constraints require examinees 
to stop working on a particular test item. 
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 Memory Storage.  Lastly, Carroll (1976) differentiated memory store 
requirements of cognitive tasks.  These requirements differ along three criteria: term, 
contents, and relevance of individual differences.  “Term” refers to the length of memory 
and implies a specific memory type.  Some tasks, such as reaction time tests, may only 
require stimuli to enter the sensory-register.  Other tasks may require short-term memory.  
Carroll considered subtests that required examinees to remember information for a 
number of minutes to use intermediate-term memory.  Other subtests may tap long-term 
memory.  Carroll considered individual differences in his scheme, because some 
individuals, especially those with certain disabilities or neurological problems, may be 
severely impaired in their memory.  Finally, Carroll (1976, Table 1, p. 38) listed 15 
different types of content that can describe subtest stimuli.   
Identifying Narrow Abilities Through Task Analysis.   
Many narrow ability classifications appear to be based on expert consensus 
studies that rely on a task analysis (e.g. McGrew, 1997).  McGrew asked ten scholars, all 
of whom were experienced with the development and interpretation of intelligence tests, 
to classify subtests into narrow ability categories. The primary ability presumed to be 
measured by a subtest was assigned a “1” rating by participants.  If a participant felt that 
a subtest measured two primary abilities, they rated each ability with a “1.”  If 
participants felt a subtest measured a lesser second ability, they rated the lesser ability 
with a “2”.  Two or three experts completed these ratings for a number of major test 
batteries. As Glutting, Watkins and Youngstrom (2003) and McGrew (1997) report, these 
ratings lacked any type of interrater reliability measurement and have been modified 
numerous times (e.g. Flanagan, McGrew & Ortiz, 2000; McGrew, 1997; McGrew & 
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Flanagan, 1998).  As a result, Glutting and colleagues stress that “placement of subtests 
within cross-battery factors was more a matter of speculative deduction than of 
demonstrable fact” (Glutting, Watkins & Youngstrom, 2003, p. 363). 
 Flanagan and colleagues (2001) used an expert consensus process to classify 
achievement-oriented subtests into CHC factors.  They sent a group of CHC experts a list 
of broad and narrow ability definitions, and included an example of a task that could be 
classified within each narrow ability definition.  Additionally, each expert received a 
packet containing approximately 40 test descriptions from a pool of 323 different tests.  
Without knowing the name of the test, or the battery it represents, experts selected one 
broad ability and one narrow ability that they felt was best reflected by the test 
description. 
 To evaluate the results of the expert classifications, Flanagan and colleagues 
(2001) estabilished criteria at both the broad and narrow ability level.  If a subtest was 
classified into a particular broad or narrow ability by 80 percent of its ratings, it was 
considered to be a measure of that particular ability.  The authors made a similar 
conclusion if a subtest was felt to measure one ability by at least 60 percent of ratings, 
and no other particular ability received more than 40 percent of the remaining abilities.  If 
a subtest had an agreement of 40 percent or more on two different broad or narrow 
abilities, it was considered a mixed ability measure.  With these evaluation criteria, the 
authors were able to classify 96 percent of the tests from their pool into broad abilities, 
and 87 percent of the tests into narrow abilities.  If there was no pattern of agreement 
from the expert ratings, then Flanagan and colleagues classified that subtest themselves.    
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The Importance of Subtest Task Demands 
 As Frisby and Parkin (2007) suggest, the CHC classification of subtests appears 
to be based on both factor analytic and logical analysis data.  Tests are classified into 
broad abilities via factor analysis studies and then further subclassified into narrow 
abilities through logical analysis which requires “a serious look at the task demands of 
individual tests” (McGrew, 1997, p. 172).  It is possible that such a classification scheme 
can confound ability and task demand variables and create confusion in subtest 
classification.  Though it is assumed that task demands are related to ability 
measurement, the extent to which classifications based on ability scores and those based 
on a logical analysis of task demands are similar is not known. Consider McGrew’s 
(1997) discussion of the Wechsler Picture Arrangement test.  While expert consensus 
suggested through logical task analysis that the subtest may measure narrow abilities 
under Gf, joint factor analytic studies demonstrated that the subtest appeared to show 
small to moderate loadings on Gv and Gc factors.  Similarly, in a study investigating task 
demand similarities across a wide number of cognitive batteries, Frisby and Parkin 
(2007) demonstrated how subtests measuring fluid intelligence and visual processing can 
appear to use similar task demands.  In their cluster analysis of 49 different subtests, they 
demonstrated how tasks such as the WJ-III Cog’s Spatial Relations or the WISC-IV’s 
Block Design test fall in the same cluster as Matrix Reasoning.  Multidimensional scaling 
procedures also noted similarities between the WJ-III Cog’s Spatial Relations, Analysis-
Synthesis and Concept Formation subtests, which were positioned toward the 
Performance end of a Verbal/Performance dimension. 
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 Floyd et al’s (2005) research on CHC composite score exchangeability may 
partially reflect this classification problem.  In their investigation, they compared Gf 
composite scores between the WJ-III Cog and the DAS, KABC-II and KAIT batteries in 
samples of children who completed more than one test battery as part of validity studies.  
The researchers were interested in whether the Gf  subtests (as well as subtests measuring 
other broad abilities) from each battery appeared to generate similar scores for the same 
examinee.  After calculating composite scores for each battery, the researchers 
demonstrated that scores supposedly measuring the same broad ability may be 
significantly different for approximately 25 percent of their sample. They note that 40 
percent of the variance across comparisons of composite scores can be attributed to the 
combination of random error and systematic error from the interaction between 
examinees and the test battery.  These interactions may include examinee ability 
level/score characteristics, examinee characteristics/temporal aspects of a test session and 
examinee characteristics/subtest requirements.  Some subtests may not be able to 
adequately assess the ability of individuals on either extreme of the normal curve due to 
an inappropriate range of items (i.e. floor or ceiling effects).  Temporal aspects of a test 
session may influence ability measurement due to practice effects, test order, or fatigue.  
Subtests may also assess extraneous narrow or abilities that are exceptionally well-
developed or exceptionally poor within the examinee.  Some tasks may also be more 
appealing to examinees, which may also influence task performance.  A direct 
implication of Floyd et al.’s work, it is possible that a fluid intelligence composite 
consisting of an inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning measure may produce a 
very different score in an examinee than a composite that consists of an inductive 
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reasoning and quantitative reasoning subtest. Finally, Floyd et al. stress that subtests’ 
reliability coefficients, their similarity in cultural and linguistic loading, and their use of 
different types of information processing may all influence exchangeability. 
Fluid Intelligence and its Task Demands 
Though CHC theory includes a wide variety of broad and narrow abilities within 
its taxonomy, the present study focuses on fluid intelligence (Gf) for a number of reasons, 
both theoretical and practical.  Fluid intelligence represents a key ability in the 
description and conceptualization of intelligence (Carroll, 1993), and abilities 
representing fluid intelligence have been included in cognitive batteries since the 
beginning of the testing movement (Pellegrino & Glaser, 1982).  Fluid intelligence can be 
a useful medium to understand the relationship between subtests task demands and their 
narrow and broad ability classifications.  Fluid intelligence tasks incorporate a wide 
variety of task demands, yet the narrow abilities classified under Gf are not too numerous 
to investigate on a small scale.  Additionally, as Pellegrino and Glaser (1982) note, tasks 
that describe fluid intelligence (particularly induction) differ in their relationship to each 
other as a function of both task form and content type. 
 Through factor analysis, Carroll (1993) isolated a number of Stratum I abilities 
subsumed under fluid intelligence: induction, general sequential reasoning (deduction), 
quantitative reasoning, Piagetian reasoning and a processing speed factor.  In general, 
subtests on various intelligence batteries appear to represent the first three abilities, which 
appear in a broad range of tasks.  In fact “the tasks that psychologists have investigated 
under the heading of reasoning comprise anything but a homogeneous domain, consisting 
 46
of everything from mental paper folding to cryptanalysis and from rearranging scrambled 
sentences to planning a nautical course” (Rips, 1984, p. 113). 
 Induction.  As a cognitive ability, induction involves the discovery of an 
underlying rule, concept or characteristic that pertains to a set of stimuli.  Often tasks use 
analogies, classification, series extrapolation or matrix completions as mechanisms for 
measurement (Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984).  Analogy problems require examinees to 
complete a statement type, such as cotton:soft :: rock:_____, or 1:3 :: 6:18 :: 2:___.  
Classification problems may use stimuli such as words, numbers or geometric shapes. 
Series extrapolation tasks may use letters, numbers or other stimuli.  Typically they 
present the examinee with a progression of stimuli and require the examinee to continue 
or finish the progression.  Matrix tasks consist of puzzles, usually a square with a number 
of different shapes or stimuli inside, where one piece is missing.  Examinees must select 
an answer to fill in the missing piece from a number of alternative responses.  All these 
tasks require examinees to induce relationships that define associations between stimuli 
and then to decide a response that fits within those relationships. 
Despite differences in task content and presentation, performance on different 
inductive reasoning tasks appears to be dependent on the same cognitive process 
(Goldman and Pellegrino, 1984).  Studies that have compared multiple ways to measure 
inductive reasoning have demonstrated striking commonalities in the process involved 
(Sternberg & Gardner, 1983).  However, some researchers note that “correlations for 
common content tend to be higher than those for common tasks differing in content” 
(Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984, p. 189).  Pellegrino and Glaser (1982) demonstrate that 
intercorrelations between induction tasks show trends based on both stimuli and task 
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process type through analysis of the Cognitive Abilities Test (CAT; Thorndike & Hagen, 
1971).  The CAT provides reasoning tests that vary in their content (verbal, figural) and 
task (analogy, classification) dimensions.  Correlations between these tasks suggest that 
a) all induction tasks demonstrate strong relationships with each other, and that b) 
correlations are stronger for tasks with the same content, rather than for tasks based on 
the same types of processes.  For instance, the Verbal Analogy and Verbal Classification 
task correlation is higher (r = .74) than the Verbal Analogy and Figural Analogy tasks (r 
= .62).  Similarly, Figural Analogy and Figural Classification correlate higher than 
Verbal Classification and Figural Classification (r = .67 vs. r = .57).  One reason for 
these findings may be that fluid intelligence tasks including significant verbal content are 
likely to tap abilities associated for crystalized intelligence more so than figural content. 
In general, success on tasks of induction require the ability to note similarities, 
dissimilarities and create integrations between test stimuli (Christou & Papageorgiou, 
2007).  Christou and Papageorgiou suggest that finding similarities may include three 
types of problems.  Class formation problems require examinees to note an attribute that 
all stimuli share in common.  Alternatively, class expansion problems require examinees 
to decide which attribute one set of stimuli may share with a second stimulus.  As a third 
type, when completing “find the common attribute” problems examinees consider 
attributes of a number of stimuli in order to ascertain similarities between a specific 
subset of stimuli.  Dissimilarity problems require examinees to induce differences in the 
attributes of, or the relationships between test stimuli.  These tasks may require 
examinees to decide which particular stimuli does not belong with other stimuli or to note 
a relationship between stimuli that excludes other stimuli.  Integration problems require 
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examinees to consider the attributes of or relationships between a number of stimuli at the 
same time.  For instance, examinees may need to decide if two relationships are 
equivalent or different, or indicate whether two sets of stimuli consist of similar or 
different characteristics. 
Cross-battery assessment guides (e.g. Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007) note 
numerous modern cognitive batteries that include tests of induction.  The WJ-III Cog’s 
Concept Formation task represents an important exemplar, where the examinee is 
presented with a series of items consisting of circles and squares that vary based on their 
color, size and number.  Any particular item consists of a drawing inside a box and a 
drawing outside a box.  The examinee is required to state a rule that confirms why one 
drawing is in the box and the other is outside of the box by making comparisons between 
the drawings.  The WISC-IV’s Matrix Reasoning and Picture Concepts also represent 
tests of induction.  For instance, Picture Concepts requires examinees to look at a number 
of rows of pictures, and pick one picture from each row that are similar in some quality. 
General sequential reasoning/deduction.  General sequential reasoning or 
deduction involves beginning with known rules and using them to arrive at a solution to a 
problem.  It is a process of generating valid conclusions based on true premises (Johnson-
Laird, 1999).  Carroll (1993) notes that syllogisms and logical reasoning tasks are 
representative of this ability.  Generally, these tasks present rules and operators that 
consist of terms such as “some,” “all,” or “greater than,” and “equal to,” as well as 
boolean operators such as “and,” “or,” and “not.”  Other tasks may use symbols to 
describe rules or premises. 
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Modern cognitive batteries may include tasks of deduction or general sequential 
reasoning.  The WJ-III Cog’s Analysis-Synthesis test requires examinees to use deduction 
to solve its items.  The examinee is presented with items consisting of a group of two to 
three colored squares that are associated with a blank square.  Each item also includes a 
key demonstrating how two colored squares are related to another color.  The examinee 
must use the information in the key to decide what color the blank square should be.  The 
Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993)’s 
Logical Steps is another illustrative test of general sequential reasoning.  In this subtest 
the examinee uses a set of rules or premises about the relationships between different 
characters to answer questions about their relative placement in a diagram. 
Quantitative Reasoning.  Quantitative reasoning reflects the ability to reason with 
mathematical quantatities.  Specifically, the ability involves the application of inductive 
or deductive reasoning to mathematics including arthimetic, algebra, geometry and 
calculus (Carroll, 1993).  Unlike with inductive or deductive tasks, Carroll does not apply 
further classification of these tasks. Instead, he suggests that many inductive or deductive 
reasoning tasks can be made into a quantitative reasoning task, for instance by making 
the premises in deduction tasks, or the discovery of rules in induction tasks that require 
the use of mathematical ability.   Cognitive batteries such as the WISC-IV, that include 
subtests like Arithmetic, or the WJ-III Cog’s Applied Problems may tap quantitative 
reasoning abilities.   
Introduction to the Study 
The proposed study attempts to determine whether classification of subtests into 
CHC narrow abilities via their task demands leads to similar conclusions when judging 
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similarity based on ability data (e.g. factor analysis). Results will inform researchers and 
practioners whether or not task analysis is viable when determining the narrow abilities 
subtests may measure.  It focuses on the classification of fluid intelligence subtests into 
narrow ability definitions.  Narrow abilities represent the third pillar of cross-battery 
assessment (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 1997), and are used to construct and interpret 
broad ability composites and to tease apart examinees’ cognitive strengths and 
weaknesses.  Therefore, an accurate understanding of the narrow abilities measured by 
subtests is critical to effective assessment.  Research identifying subtests’ classification 
into CHC broad and narrow abilities has utilized both factor analytic and expert 
consensus methodology.  Expert consensus studies and task analysis methods can suggest 
which specific narrow abilities a subtest may measure, and represent a method of content 
validity (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007).  However, as in the case with the Wechsler 
Picture Arrangment subtest, these methods may confound ability and task demand 
variables.  Expert consensus classification suggested that Picture Arrangement may 
measure fluid intelligence abilities, while factor analysis suggest small to moderate 
loadings on visual processing and crystalized abilities (McGrew, 1997).  Currently, it is 
unknown exactly how subtest task demands influence ability measurement, but 
researchers have hypothesized that their information-processing characteristics may play 
a role in why broad ability composite scores from the same individual may vary across 
test batteries (Floyd et al., 2005).   
To investigate the viability of task-analysis when discerning the narrow 
ability(ies) a cognitive task may measure, this study compares two different empirical 
methods of classifying subtests.  The first method provides an ability classification of 
 51
subtests through the factor analysis of subtest scores.  The second method classifies 
subtests via their task demands by asking practitioners to sort subtests into groups based 
on similarities they perceive in written descriptions of task demands.  These sortings are 
subjected to cluster analysis as a method of classification  Using cluster analysis, this 
method provides an alternative statistical procedure from the agreement-percentages used 
in previous methods (McGrew, 1997; Flanagan, Ortiz, Alfonso & Mascolo, 2001).  It also 
minimizes the concern over individual research bais evident in the history of task demand 
classification (Frisby & Parkin, 2007).  Lastly, the process used in this method highlights 
similarities among groups of subtests, because participants compare subtests to each 
other.  Alternatively, previous methods of categorization did not require participants to 
make comparisons between subtests .  In contrast, this study requires participants to make 
judgments of the relative degree of perceived similarity between subtests. 
This investigation uses six subtests hypothesized to measure inductive, deductive 
and quantitative reasoning abilities as target subtests.  These include Picture Concepts 
from the WISC-IV and Concept Formation from the WJ-III Cog as measures of inductive 
reasoning, Logical Steps from the KAIT and Analysis/Synthesis from the WJ-III Cog as 
measures of deductive reasoning and Arithmetic from the WISC-IV and Math Reasoning 
from the WIAT-II as measures of quantitative reasoning.  If these subtests are classified 
similarly based on task analysis and ability analysis, then it is possible to infer a 
relationship between the two methods.  It would also imply that similarities among 
subtests in their task demands plays a role in explaining shared variance among subtests 
observed in factor analytic studies. 
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 Additionally, the proposed study contributes to the literature by providing an 
ability-focused factor analysis of a CHC broad ability, fluid intelligence.  To date, factor 
analytic research has used a battery-focused methodology by including all subtests of two 
batteries.  As an alternative, the proposed study will include only fluid intelligence 
subtests from a multiple batteries.  By providing a finer classification of fluid intelligence 
subtests, results from this study should aid practitioners in selecting subtests to ensure 
adequate construct representation in their batteries and to supplement narrow ability 
measurement in the face of discrepancies within broad ability composites. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis for the confirmatory factor analysis.  The study will use confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) procedures to compare the fit of two models to data provided by 
six fluid intelligence subtests administered to youth.  These models are outlined in 
Figures 1 and 2.  The first model describes a one-factor structure for the six fluid 
intelligence subtests.  It indicates that each subtest will contribute to the measurement of 
a single latent variable, fluid intelligence.  In contrast, the second model suggests that 
each pair of subtests will measure narrow abilities judge by the literature to be associated 
with fluid intelligence (e.g. induction, general sequential reasoning/deduction, and 
quantitative reasoning).  In line with CHC theory, it is hypothesized that the three-factor 
model will best fit the six subtests targeted in this study. 
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Figure 1.  Hypothesized one-factor model for confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Hypothesized three-factor model for confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
 
 Hypotheses for the task analysis.  In this part of the study, participants will sort 
brief subtest descriptions into similar groups based on their functional task 
characteristics.  Subtests include tasks that involve reasoning skills (e.g. Gf), but also  
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math skills, processing speed and visual-spatial abilities, as “distractors.”  Distractors are 
included to ensure that participants are attending to cognitive processes implied in the 
cognitive subtests, and not the superficial characteristics of the task.  It is hypothesized 
that induction tests will be sorted into the same group, as will deduction and quantiative 
reasoning tests.  However, likely the mathematics knowledge tests will cluster with the 
quantitative reasoning tests, despite their different functional requirements.  
 Hypotheses integrating both methods.  If these methods provide similar results, 
than the factor analysis will indicate that a three-factor model bests fits the ability data.  
Similarly, the cluster analysis will sort the six target subtests into separate clusters. 
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 CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
 
Approval by Human Subjects Committee  
The investigator of this study completed ethics training required by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Missouri (MU).  The project, and 
its associated materials, was submitted to, and approved by the MU IRB. 
Participants 
 Phase 1 Ability Analysis. The participants in this investigation were 63 
respondents between the ages of 11 and 16 (mean age = 12 years 9 months).  The age 
range is reflective of the minimum and maximum ages included in the norming samples 
of some of the cognitive instruments used in this study.  Approximately 68.3 percent of 
the respondents in this sample were female.  Ethnicity was judged informally by the 
investigator; 84.1 percent, were white, 12.7 percent were African American, and 3.2 
percent were Latina/o.   
           Phase 2 Task Analysis. Respondents consisted of  a convenience sample of 43 
individuals, employed in Missouri school districts, who have extensive experience with 
psychoeducational assessment.  Out of the 43 individuals who participated, 11 
individuals provided incomplete data, and as a result, their responses could not be 
included as part of the cluster analyses used to analyze data.  Thus, the final sample 
included 32 professionals in school psychology.  
 As part of their participation, respondents were asked to provide basic 
demographic information, and also data about their professional experiences.  
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Specifically, respondents provded their age, race and gender.  They also indicated their 
years of professional experience, their experience with specific psychometric tests, and 
rated their familiarity with test intepretation through CHC theory on a 1-5 point likert 
scale.  This information is summarized in Table 1, and a copy of the questionnaire is 
included in Appendix B.  To ensure that there were no differences between individuals 
who completed and did not complete the sorting task, a chi-square (χ2 )test of 
independence was used to report whether there was a difference in the frequency that 
each group endorsed experience with each psychometric test.  The results, listed in Table 
1, were interpreted using a conservative (α = .01) alpha level to correct for type I errors 
due to the numerous comparisons.  Results indicated that there were no differences 
between the sample of individuals that provided complete data to the task analysis and 
the sample of individuals who provided incomplete data in terms of their use of specific 
cognitive tests.  Also listed in Table 1, independent samples t-tests indicate that there is 
no difference in age, t(39) = .201, p = .842, or years of experience, t(27) = -.492, p = .627 
between the two groups.  The groups also endorsed a similar degree of CHC test 
interpretation in their work, t(40) = -.665, p = .51.  However, the individuals who did not 
provide complete sorting data collectively endorsed a higher knowledge of CHC theory 
compared to the group that provided complete sorting data, t(33.52) = -2.41, p = .02.  
Due to signficant differences in variance between groups, as assessed through Levene’s 
Test of Equality of Variance, a corrected t-test was interpreted. 
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 Table 1.  
 
Card Sorting Sample Demographic Information 
     
 Complete Sort 
(N= 32) 
 Incomplete Sort 
(N = 11) 
 
     
 Mean  (SD)  Mean  (SD)  
Age (Years) 42.1 (12.06)  41 (12.97)  
Years Paid 11.67 (9.96)  14 (7.58)  
  N(%)   
Position     
Intern 3 (9.4)  0 (0)  
Psychology Examiner 6 (18.8)  3 (27.3)  
School Psychologist 18 (56.3)  8 (72.7)  
Licensed Psychologist 4 (12.5)  0 (0)  
Diagnostician 1 (3.1)  0 (0)  
     
Test Experience*     
Bayley I 11 (34)  4 (36.4)  
Bayley II 4 (12.5)  2 (18.2)  
CAS 3 (9.4)  0 (0)  
CTONI 20 (62.5)  7 (63.3)  
DAS 8 (25.0)  4 (36.4)  
DAS-II 13 (40.6)  2 (18.2)  
DTLA-3 3 (9.4)  0 (0)  
DTLA-4 2 (6.3)  0 (0)  
KABC 16 (50.0)  6 (54.5)  
KABC-II 12 (37.5)  6 (54.5)  
KAIT 2 (6.3)  0 (0)  
K-BIT 9 (28.1)  3 (27.3)  
Leiter 23 (71.9)  8 (72.7)  
RIAS 9 (28.1)  0 (0)  
SIT-R 5 (15.6)  3 (27.3)  
SB-IV 19 (59.4)  9 (81.8)  
SB-V 23 (71.9)  9 (81.8)  
UNIT 23 (71.9)  7 (63.6)  
WAIS-III 22 (68.8)  8 (72.7)  
WISC-III 27 (84.4)  9 (81.8)  
WISC-IV 31 (96.9)  11 (100)  
WJ-R 13 (40.6)  6 (54.5)  
WJ-III Cog 22 (68.8)  8 (72.7)  
WPPSI-R 18 (56.3)  3 (27.3)  
WPPSI-III 21 (65.6)  6 (54.5)  
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 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  
CHC (Likert Scale)     
CHC Knowledge  3.16 (1.04)  3.7 (0.48)*  
Use CHC in Practice 2.60 (0.87)  2.8 (0.79)  
*signficant, p < .05  -  percentages reflect the number of participants that endorsed having 
experience administering a specific test - CHC knowledge was assessed on likert scales 
with a range of 1-5. 
 
Instruments (Materials) 
 Phase 1 Ability Analysis. Subtests were selected as measures of Gf subtests based 
on classifications identified in previous literature (Buckhalt, McGhee, & Ehrler, 2001; 
Flanagan & McGrew, 1998; Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007; Flanagan, Ortiz, Alfonso 
& Mascolo, 2001; Keith, Kranzler & Flanagan, 2001; Phelps et.al., 2005; Sanders et. al., 
2007; Woodcock, 1990) and represent inductive, deductive and quantitative reasoning 
abilities.  These abilities were measured by subtests from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children, Fourth Edition, the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test, the 
Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities, Third Edition, and the Wechsler 
Individual Achievement Test, Second Edition.  Inductive tests include the WISC-IV 
Picture Concepts and the WJ-III Cog Concept Formation.  Analysis/Synthesis, also from 
the WJ-III Cog and Logical Steps from the KAIT represent deductive subtests.  
Arithmetic (WISC-IV) and the WIAT-II’s Mathematical Reasoning subtest reflect 
quantitative reasoning measures.  These tests were selected specifically for their varied 
task demands in comparison to one another.  For instance, the KAIT, though an older 
measure (normed in 1993), provides an important measure of deductive reasoning 
(Flanagan & McGrew, 1998) that appears more unique in terms of task demands placed 
on the examinee than the demands from more current cognitive batteries.  In comparison, 
Visual Coding, is a subtest from the Leiter-R, whose task demands appear too similar to 
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the Analysis-Synthesis subtest from the WJ-III Cog.  Thus, not only has the KAIT Logical 
Steps subtest been empirically classified as measuring general sequential reasoning, it 
would be a better test to use when comparing these results to the phase 2 (task demands 
classification study) because it provides more task-diversity to the six subtests used in 
this phase of the study. 
Phase 2 Task Analysis. Rationale for Subtest Selection.  Phase II of the study 
classifies subtests based on their task demands.  Authors of cross-battery assessment 
manuals (Flanagan, McGrew & Ortiz, 2000; Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007; McGrew 
& Flanagan, 1998) and CHC theory researchers (Flanagan & McGrew, 1998; Keith, Fine, 
Taub, Reynolds & Kranzler, 2006; McGrew, 1997; Phelps, McGrew, Knopik & Ford, 
2005; Reynolds et. al., 2007; Sanders, McIntosh, Dunham, Rothlisberg & Finch, 2007; 
Taub & McGrew, 2004) have created categorizations of subtests at the broad and narrow 
ability level.  These materials were used to create a list of subtests that are hypothesized 
to be primary measures of fluid intelligence to be included in this part of the study.  
”Distractor” subtests (subtest descriptions other than the “target” subtests) were included 
to a) provide enough stimuli to create meaningful clusters, and b) investigate whether 
participants were making similarity judgments based on the surface level characteristics 
of tasks, or the underlying processes they require for completion. In short, this enables 
the researcher to determine how participants classify the target subtests in the context of 
other subtests. Generally, subtests that appear to be partial measures of fluid intelligence 
abilities, but also measure other cognitive abilities (e.g. Rover from the KABC-II, 
Planning from theWJ-III Cog) were not included in the classification task.  This 
requirement is essential to make sure the study corresponds to important CHC principles, 
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specifically, avoiding “mixed” tests to ease interpretation issues (Flanagan, Ortiz & 
Alfonso, 2007).   
However, there will be two exceptions to this rule.  First, the study used the 
WISC-IV Arithmetic subtest even though researchers have argued about which 
ability(ies) this test may measure (Keith et. al., 2006).  However, recent confirmatory 
factor analyses of the WISC-IV suggest that Arithmetic may be best interpreted as a 
primary measure of fluid intelligence (Keith et. al.) and therefore should be included in 
this study.  Second the study included a number of “distractor” subtest descriptions.  
These subtests appear to have surface level features that make them seem similar to 
subtests that primarily measure fluid intelligence, but they nevertheless are classified as 
measures of other types of Stratum II abilities. 
Subtests from the test batteries analyzed by the literature were further paired 
down by removing subtests that appeared to have duplicate task demands with other 
subtests.  For instance, the DAS-II (Picture Similarities) and the Leiter-R (Classification) 
both include subtests that require participants to match a target picture to another picture 
within a group of target stimuli.  Thus, only one of these subtests was be included as part 
of this study.   
There was one exception to this rule.  Applied Problems, a mathematics reasoning 
test from the WJ-III Cog, and Math Reasoning, a subtest from the WIAT-II, though 
similar in their task demands, will both be included as a part of this study as a validity 
check.  The purpose of this procedure is to provide an indirect assessment of participants’ 
vigilance through out the task.  Due to the similarities of these two tests, if participants 
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were vigilant in completing their sorting, these two tests should be positioned closely to 
each other. 
Creation of Subtest Descriptions.  Subtest descriptions were written to highlight 
their task demands, but did not explicitly mention specific cognitive abilities that may 
tapped as they are completed.  All subtest descriptions were created with the same 
language, and used the same structure to minimize any influence a writing style may have 
on how participants may interpret the description. 
Subtests Hypothesized to Be Measures of Induction.  Selected subtests that 
measure inductive reasoning processes were selected from the Woodcock-Johnson Test of 
Cognitive Abilities, Third Edition (e.g. Concept Formation), the Weschler Intelligence 
Scale for Children, Fourth Edition (e.g. Picture Concepts), the Kaufman Assessment 
Battery for Children, Second Edition (e.g. Pattern Reasoning), the Kaufman Adolescent 
and Adult Intelligence Test (e.g. Mystery Codes), and the Leiter International 
Performance Scale – Revised (e.g. Classification, Repeat Patterns).  Descriptions of 
these subtests’ task demands are provided in Appendix A. 
 Subtests Hypothesized to Measures of General Sequential Reasoning.  Selected 
subtests that appear to measure general sequential or deductive reasoning were included 
from the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities, Third Edition (e.g. 
Analysis/Synthesis), the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (e.g. Logical 
Steps), and the Leiter International Performance Scale – Revised (e.g. Picture Context, 
Visual Coding).  Descriptions of these tasks are located in Appendix A. 
 Subtests Hypothesized to Measure Quantitative Reasoning.  Selected subtests that 
appear to measure quantiative reasoning were included from the Woodcock Johnson Test 
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of Cognitive Abilities, Third Edition Diagnostic Supplement (e.g. Number Matrices, 
Number Series), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition (e.g. 
Arithmetic), the Differential Abilities Scale, Second Edition (e.g. Sequential & 
Quantitative Reasoning), and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test, Second Edition 
(Wechsler, 2001) (e.g. Math Reasoning) and the Woodcock Johnson Test of Achievement, 
Third Edition (e.g. Applied Problems).  Appendix B includes descriptions of these 
subtests. 
 Subtests Hypothesized to Measure More than One Gf Narrow Ability.  Subtests 
from the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, Second Edition (e.g. Story 
Completion), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition (e.g. Matrix 
Reasoning) may measure more than one narrow, fluid intelligence ability were also 
included in this study.  These subtests were included because many of their 
characteristics were similar to some of the six target subtests, and also because they may 
measure both inductive and deductive reasoning – their descriptions are located in 
Appendix A.   
 Subtests Included as Distractors.  A number of additional subtests that have been 
classified by cross-battery advocates as measures of other CHC abilities were also 
included in the card sorting task.  These tests were included because they share surface 
features with many of the fluid intelligence subtests discussed earlier.  Their inclusion 
will test whether participants sort subtests by the cognitive processes they appear to 
measure, as opposed to sorting  by functional characteristics and surface features. 
 Many of these distractor subtests are thought to measure visual-spatial abilities 
(e.g. Flangan, Alfonso & Ortiz, 2007).  Many visual-spatial tests appear to share 
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similarities in common with fluid intelligence subtests.  For instance, Frisby and Parkin 
(2007) showed that both Gf subtests and Gv subtest appear to be characterized as 
“performance” subtests.  Other subtests were chosen for the different ways they use 
numbers as stimuli to assess different cognitive abilities.  Digit-Span, from the WISC-IV, 
uses numbers to assess memory span abilities.  Alternatively, Calculation (WJ-III 
Achievement) and Numerical Operations (WIAT-II) use numbers as math problems to 
assess knowledge of mathematical principles.  Some subtests were included because they 
have a key or a code as part of their task demands, a hallmark of deductive reasoning 
subtests.  Digit-Symbol Coding (WISC-IV), and Planned Codes (CAS) require examinees 
to use a code to complete their tasks, and measure aspects of processing-speed.  Visual-
Auditory Learning (WJ-III Cog) teaches examinees a code to assess how they are able to 
associate two types of information together.  If participants sort subtests merely based on 
surface feature similarities (and not in terms of cognitive processing requirements) these 
distractor subtests may (incorrectly) appear in clusters with the fluid intelligence subtests.  
However, if participants sort the subtests more by their processing requirements, these 
subtests may appear in alternative clusters.  Descriptions of these subtests are located in 
Appendix A. 
Materials Given to Participants.  To complete this part of the study, participants 
were given a set of 32 index cards with subtest descriptions printed on them (see 
Appendix A), and an answer form to record their responses (see Appendix B).   
 Instructions.  Participants received oral and written instructions to read all cards 
and then sort them into piles of similarities based on the abilities described through the 
written task descriptions.  A copy of the instructions is given in Appendix B.  They were 
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told to make at least 3 piles of cards and to place at least 2 cards in each pile.  These 
requirements were necessary for analysis purposes.  Since the six target subtests were 
hypothesized to reflect three different narrow abilities, requiring participants to sort test 
descriptions into a minimum of three piles was necessary to determine if participants 
readily distinguish between inductive, deductive and quantitative reasoning.  Requiring at 
least two cards to be included in one pile or category was necessary, because similarity 
judgments between cards were the unit of analysis.  If only one card was included in a 
pile, no similarity data would be generated in that category.  After sorting the cards, 
participants recorded their results on a response sheet (see Appendix B).  
Procedure 
Phase 1 Ability Analysis.  Participants were recruited through a summer school 
program at a middle school in rural, central Missouri.  Recruitment flyers and consent 
forms were sent home to parents which explained participation requirements and the pros 
and cons of participation (see appendix C).  Any student who returned their consent form 
was eligible to participate.  All participants were administered the six subtests, in random 
order, by the investigator at their school program.  Each participant received a $5 gift 
certificate to McDonald’s as a token of appreciation for their participation. 
Phase 2 Task Analysis. Participants were recruited from school districts in the 
state of Missouri.  School districts’ directors of psychological services were contacted by 
the investigator to inquire about opportunities for data collection.  With the director’s 
permission, the investigator collected data in a group format, during a department 
meeting at three different sites.  Participants were given a consent form along with a 
response sheet and a stack of index cards that contained printed subtest descriptions.  If 
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an individual wished to participate, they completed the sorting task, which required 
approximately half an hour.  At the end of the task, participants were entered into a 
drawing for a gift certificate, as a token of appreciation. 
Data Analysis 
 Phase 1 Ability Analysis.  The six subtests used in this part of the investigation 
are interpreted through different measurement scales in clinical practice.  Scores from 
Arithmetic, Picture Concepts and Logical Steps are interpreted by using a mean of 10 and 
a standard deviation of 3.  Math Reasoning, Concept Formation and Analysis-Synthesis 
use a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.  Thus, in order to ease interpretation, 
before statistical analysis, the Arithmetic, Picture Concepts, and Logical Steps subtest 
scores were converted to a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15 with the following 
formula: ((X – 10)/3) * 15 + 100. This formula converts their scores to Z scores, and then 
converts the Z scores to a scaled score having a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 
15. 
As described in the review of relevant literature, past research has outlined the 
hypothesized factor structure for the six subtests in this phase of the study in accordance 
with CHC theory.  Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) procedures were used for model 
testing.  Often consdered more theory driven that exploratory factor analysis (EFA; 
Keith, 2005), CFA allows for the creation and testing of hypotheses by the comparison of 
competing models.  Two models were tested: 1) a one-factor model that specified all 
subtests loading onto the same factor (posited to be a Gf, fluid intelligence factor), and 2) 
a three factor model that specified each pair of subtests loading together, as would be 
predicted by CHC theory.   A χ2 test was used as an initial test of each model’s fit.  The χ2 
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test evaluates whether the covariance matrix in the data set is significantly different from 
the  covariance matrix implied by the model (Keith). Thus, a significant χ2 test indicates 
that the modeled relationships reflect a poor fit to the data.  It is important to note that the 
χ2 test is sensitive to sample size (Brown, 2006; Keith, 2005; Klem, 2000).  When used 
with a large sample size, a χ2 test may suggest that a model’s covariance matrix is 
significantly different from the data’s covariance matrix, even when it is not.  Likewise, 
with a small sample size, the χ2  test may indicate an excellent fit even if one does not 
exist.   
Due to the limitations associated with the χ2  test, a number of goodness of fit 
statistics were calculated to assist in determining the degree to which these models fit the 
results of the subtest measurement (Brown, 2006; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Keith, 2005).  
These fit statistics were chosen because they reflect absolute, comparitive, and parsimony 
correction fit statistics.  Further, they reflect some of the more popular in the research 
base, and perform well in Monte Carlo research (Brown, 2006).  The Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI) and the comparitive fit index (CFI) were calculated to compare each model to a 
“null” model where all variables are assumed to be unrelated.  TLI and CFI values over 
.95 suggest excellent model fits, and values greater than .90 suggest adequate fit.  The 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) was assessed to measure the model’s 
approximate fit to the data (in comparison to χ2 evaluation of an exact fit).  Alternatively, 
the SRMR represents the average or standardized discrepancy between the correlations 
presented in the correlation matrix, and the correlations predicted by the hypothesized 
models (Brown, 2006; Keith, 2005).  Low values for the SRMR and RMSEA (below .06) 
suggest that there is little descrepency between the two matrices and indicate better fits.  
 67
Akaikes Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) were also 
used to inspect the relative fit of one model to the other. Values from these fit statistics 
are interpreted relative to their results from different models.  When comparing models, 
the model with the lower AIC and BIC value represents the model of better fit. 
Phase 2 Task Analysis. Each participant’s responses were converted into a 32 x 32 
similarity matrix.  Each value in a cell represented the total number of times a subtest pair 
were sorted into the same pile.  For example, if a participant sorted subtest 5 and subtest 
28 into the same category, a 1 would be entered into the (5, 28) matrix cell.  After a 
matrix had been made for each participant in the study, all values in each cell were 
summed to create a grand 32 x 32 matrix.  In this final matrix, if the cell (10, 19) 
contained a score of 0, it would mean that subtest 10 and subtest 19 were not sorted into 
the same category by any participant in the study.  Alternatively, higher values within a 
cell means that more participants sorted the subtests together, and hence they would have 
a higher pairwise similarity rating. 
These values provide similarity distance scores for use in cluster analyses 
specifying a range of solutions containing three to seven clusters.  Cluster analysis is an 
appropriate technique for this investigation because it classifies data into groups based on 
investigator specifications and will create a specified number of homogenous groups of 
subtests.  Thus, the abilities measured by subtests in the same cluster, as assessed by 
subtest task demands, are considered to be similar to each other.  
SPSS’ QUICK SORT, a non-hierarchical analysis was used, because it is not 
agglomerative in generating solutions.  This means that a six cluster solution, is not 
merely the result of combining two clusters from a seven cluster solution, but rather a 
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solution that creates the best six cluster solution, cluster membership will be free to vary 
based on the specified target solution. (Hair & Black, 2000).  SPSS’ QUICK SORT 
algorithym is considered a sequential threshold non-hierarchical procedure (Hair & 
Black).  It creates initial seed points based a random observation in the data set, and then 
includes all observations within a certain different with it as a cluster.  Next, it selects a 
second random seed point and continues until all specified clusters are created. 
Data was subjected to analyses specifying three through seven cluster solutions.  
Three was used as the initial solution because it reflects the minimum amount of clusters 
that participants were asked to create.  Seven was used as the highest number of clusters, 
as it reflects the largest hypothesized amount of cluster that participants may create while 
completing the sorting task. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 
Phase I: Classification Based on Factor Analysis 
Data Screening.  Data screening was conducted in SPSS, version 11.5 (2002) to 
check whether data met assumptions for multivariate analysis, including normality, 
linearity and homoscedacticity.  The assumption of normality means that the distribution 
of scores within a variable approximately reflect a normal curve.  Univariate normality 
was assessed for each subtest’s distribution by comparing its kurtosis and skewness to a 
null hypothesis of zero with a conventional, albeit conservative alpha level of .001 (e.g. Z 
= 3.29; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  As indicated in Table 2, not only were skewness 
and kurtosis levels for all variables non-significant with the conventional alpha level, all 
were within one standard deviation of 0 (e.g. 1.96), suggesting that all distributions were 
close to appropriate levels of normality.  The assumption of homoscedacticity stresses 
that the variability in scores from one variable is approximately the same as variability in 
scores from another variable.  Linearity assumes a stright-line relationship between two 
variables.  Both homoscedacticity and linearity were assessed by inspecting bivariate 
scatterplots between all combiniation of variables.  There were no variable pairs that 
demonstrated significant violations of heteroscedasticity and all demonstrated linear 
relationships.   
Analyses were run using Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2007) with maximum 
liklihood modeling (ML), using the raw scores for input.   An important assumption of 
ML modeling is that variables conform to a multivariate normal distribution (Kline, 
2004). Multivariate kurtosis was assessed with Mardia’s Coefficient, using the SPSS 
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macro provided by DeCarlo (1997). Results indicated that multivariate normality was 
within acceptable limits.  Multivariate outliers were assessed through the calculation of 
Mahalanobis distance.  No outliers were detected using a conservative alpha level (.001), 
as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). 
 
Table 2.  
Normality Testing 
 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Picture Concept 1.7  .30 
Concept Formation .35 .77 
Analysis/Synthesis 1.68 1.74 
Logical Steps .08 .77 
Math Reasoning 1.83 .34 
Arithmetic 1.30 1.35 
Values higher than 1.96 represent p < .05; Values higher than 3.29 represent p <  .001 
 
The data set was also assessed for bivariate and multivariate multicollinearity 
through an inspection of bivariate correlations, and through collinearity diagnostics 
available through SPSS.  Multicollinearity can occur in a correlation matrix when 
variables are too highly correlated with each other and can result in the specification of 
improper solutions during CFA analyses (Brown, 2006).  Table 3 indicates that there are 
a number of correlations approaching or above .70, though these values do not suggest 
the existance of bivariate multicollinearity in the sample data.  Similarly, collinearity 
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diagnostics do not indicate multicollinearity in the data set through multivariate 
correlations.  Condition index values, measures of the dependency of one variable on 
others in the data set, are associated with instability in the standard error of parameter 
estimates for a given variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  When condition index values 
are above 30 and the variance proportion of two or more variables load highly on that 
index (e.g. .50 or higher), it indicates a high level of multicollinearity (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007).  The condition indexes for the data set are listed in Table 4.  Both 
dimension six and seven demonstrate condition indexes over 30. In this analysis, 
dimensions reflect eigenvalues, measures of variance within a given matrix (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007).  The Analysis/Synthesis and Math Reasoning subtests both load very 
highly on dimension seven.  However, it is noteworthy that this particular dimension has 
a value of 0, which means it is not associated with variance in the data matrix.  Thus, 
even though dimension seven has a high condition index and is highly associated with 
two different variables, results of the diagnostics do not indicate significant 
multicollinearity.  
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 Table 3.  
 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Gf Subtests for n = 63 participants. 
  
Mean (SD) 
 
PC 
 
CF 
 
AS 
 
LS 
 
MR 
 
AR 
Pic. Con (PC) 98.17 (17.35)       
Con.Form (CF) 100.41 (15.75) .49      
An/Syn (AS) 97.33 (11.74) .35 .60     
Log.Steps (LS) 104.44 (15.48) .43 .58 .40    
MathRea (MR) 96.75 (16.73) .44 .72 .66 .67   
Arith (AR) 97.33 (11.74) .32 .57 .50 .57 .70  
All correlations significant at .01 level 
Table 4.  
 
Multicollinearity diagnositics with six Gf subtests 
  
Variance Proportions 
Dimension Eigen 
Value 
Cond. 
Index 
PC CF AS LS MR AR 
1 6.93 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .02 17.89 .64 .00 .00 .00 .04 .12 
3 .02 20.93 .20 .02 .07 .01 .05 .01 
4 .01 24.98 .02 .29 .11 .17 .03 .25 
5 .01 26.50 .11 .01 .02 .51 .01 .51 
6 .01 31.42 .03 .68 .18 .00 .29 .08 
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7 .00 41.84 .00 .00 .63 .30 .57 .03 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Three-Factor Model.  The three-factor model 
specifying an induction (Picture Concepts and Concept Formation), deduction 
(Analysis/Synthesis and Logical Steps), and quantitative reasoning (Math Reasoning and 
Arithmetic) factor (see Figure 2) was analyzed in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2007) with 
maximum liklihood modeling (ML), using the standard scores for input.  Though the 
model converged normally, the latent variable covariance matrix was not positive 
definite.  Specifically, the relationship between the deduction factor with both the 
induction and quantitative reasoning factor was estimated to be greater than 1.  Thus, 
results can not be interpreted appropriately.  This improper solution is most likely a result 
of the low sample size used in the analysis.  A number of attempts were made to 
respecify the model.  These included contraining the factor loadings of each pair of 
indicators on each latent variable to be equal, and constraining the error variance 
associated with the deducation latent factor to 0.  These attempts were unsuccessful in 
fixing the model. 
However, it was still possible to compare a two factor model, consisting of 
induction and quantitative reasoning factors to a one factor model (e.g. Gf).  The rest of 
these analyses, compared a two factor model to the one factor model using the Picture 
Concept, Concept Formation, Arithmetic and Math Reasoning subtests.  Logical Steps 
and Analysis/Synthesis were deleted from the analysis, because their latent factor was 
associated with the CFA’s improper solution.  
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the One Factor and Two Factor Models.  A 
reassessment of multicollinearity in a data set only including Math Reasoning, 
Arithmetic, Picture Concepts and Arithmetic subtests is listed in Table 6.  Though both 
Matrix Reasoning and Concept Formation load heavily on the fifth dimension, since the 
dimension’s Condition Index is not greater than 30, it can be reasoned that there is no 
significant multicollinearity in the new variable set. 
Table 5.   
Multicollinearity diagnostics with four subtests 
  
Variance Proportions 
Dimension Eig. Value Cond. Idx PC CF MR AR 
1 4.95 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .021 15.21 .61 .01 .06 .15 
3 .014 18.49 .20 .03 .08 .00 
4 .010 22.15 .19 .46 .02 .58 
5 .01 27.79 .00 .51 .83 .26 
 
Two new models were specified based on subtests measuring inductive and math 
reasoning.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the model and provide the factor loadings for each 
subtest.  Model fit statistics are presented in Table 6.  The Gf, one-factor model’s  χ2 
value is non-significant, suggesting that it’s estimated covariance model and the 
covariance model provided by the actual data are not statistically different from each 
other.  Other fit statistics (CFI, TFI, SMRS and RMSEA) also indicate an excellent fit to 
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the data.  CFI and TFI values are greater than .95, the RMSEA is closed to .06, while the 
SMRS is significantly lower than .06. 
CFA results indicate that a two-factor model provides an excellent fit to the 
sample data as well (see Table 6). The model’s  χ2 value CFI, TLI, SMR and RMSEA 
values are all in the range of excellent fit (Brown, 2006; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Keith, 
2005).  Moreover, they indicate that the two-factor model is a better fit than the one-
factor, Gf model.  The CFI value of 1.00 represents the maximum value possible for the 
statistic.  The TLI value, 1.05, is interpreted similar to the CFI.  However, it is possible 
for its values to exceed 1.0 (Brown, 2006).  Additional statistics included in the table, the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayes information critierion (BIC) are 
measures of relative fit (Keith, 2005).  These statistics are interpreted relatively to other 
models, where smaller values indicate better fits.  These statistics provide confliciting 
results; while the AIC suggests the two factor model is a better fit, the BIC favors the 
one-factor model.  Though both models represent excellent data fits, the two-factor model 
appears to be the better fitting model.  The CFI, TFI, RMSEA and SMRS fits favor it, 
and in general, it’s factor loadings are larger, while its error variances are smaller, 
compared to the one-factor model. 
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 Figure 3. One-factor model with four subtests, including factor loading. 
 
Figure 4. Two-factor model with four subtests, including factor loadings. 
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Table 6.  
 
Fit statistics comparing one-factor and two-factor models 
 
Model 
 
 
χ2
 
Df 
 
P 
 
CFI 
 
TFI 
 
RMSEA
 
SRMR 
 
AIC 
 
BIC 
Gf 
 
2.69 2 .26 .993 .980 .07 .03 2042.84 2068.56
I + QR 
 
.10 1 .76 1.00 1.05 .00 .01 2042.25 2070.11
 
CFI: Comparative Fit Index; TLI: Tucker Lewis Index; RMSEA: Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation; SRMR:  Standard Root Mean Square Residual; AIC: Akaike's 
Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. 
Phase II: Classification Based on Functional Task Analysis 
 The grand similarity matrix, created by summing the cells of each participant’s 
responses, was subjected to 3 through 7 means nonhierarchical cluster analysis through 
SPSS’ QUICK SORT algorithm.  The results of these sortings are provided in Table 7, 
where each subtest’s cluster membership can be compared across 3 through 7 cluster 
solutions.  The six target subtests and validity check subtest are highlighted in bold.  The 
hypothesized deductive tasks, Analysis/Synthesis and Logical Steps clustered together 
when 5 clusters were specified.  They continued to cluster together in the 6 and 7 cluster 
solution.  The inductive tasks, Picture Concepts and Concept Formation clustered 
together in the initial 3 cluster solution and continued to cluster together in the other 
solutions.  Math Reasoning and Arthimetic, the quantitative reasoning subtests, clustered 
together in all solutions except the 7 cluster solution.  Results indicated that five clusters 
was the minimum number of clusters required to determine when these three sets of 
subtests will cluster together. 
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Table 7 
 
Subtest Cluster Membership By 3,4,5,6, and 7 Cluster Solution 
 
Subtest Name Cluster Solution 
 
 3 4 5  6 7 
Analysis/Synthesis (Deduction)  2  4  1  1  1 
Logical Steps (Deduction)  1  2  1  1  1 
Picture Concepts (Induction  2  4  4  2  7 
Concept Formation (Induction)  2  4  4  2  7 
Arithmetic (Quant. Reasoning)  3  3  3  3  3 
Math Reasoning (Quant. Reas)  3  3  3  3  2 
Applied Problems (Validity)  3  1  2  4  4 
Picture Arrangement  1  2  1  1  1 
Digit-Sym Coding  1  2  5  5  5 
Numerical Operations  3  3  3  3  3 
Word Reasoning  1  2  5  6  6 
Mystery Codes  2  4  1  1  1 
Vis.Aud. Learning  1  2  5  5  5 
Classification  2  4  4  2  7 
Planned Codes  1  2  1  5  5 
Digit Span  1  2  5  5  5 
Odd Item Out  2  4  4  2  7 
Matrix Reasoning  2  4  4  2  7 
Similarities  1  2  1  1  1 
Story Completion  2  4  1  1  1 
Spatial Relations  2  4  4  2  7 
Repeated Patterns  2  4  4  2  7 
Seq. Quant. Reas.  2  4  4  2  7 
Symbolic Memory  1  2  5  5  5 
Pattern Reasoning  2  4  4  2  7 
Nonverbal Memory  1  2  5  5  5 
Calculation  3  3  3  3  3 
Visual Coding  2  4  4  2  7 
Verbal Spatial Rel  1  2  1  6  6 
Number Matrices  2  4  4  2  7 
Picture Completion  2  4  1  1  7 
Number Series  2  4  1  1  1 
 
 The contents of each cluster within each solution are described in Tables 8 
through 12.  The three cluster solution outlined one cluster mixed with fluid reasoning 
and distractor subtests, and second cluster containing mostly (though not exclusively) 
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memory-oriented subtests, and a third cluster containing only math related tests.  
However, it is interesting to note that the third cluster did not contain all possible math 
subtests.  Number Series and Number Matrices were both placed in the second cluster.  
When a four cluster solution was specified, the addition of a fourth cluster only moved 
the Applied Problems subtest to its own cluster, all cluster membership of all other 
subtest descriptions remained the same as the previous solution.  The fivecluster solution 
moved the memory-oriented subtests into their own cluster, along with Coding and Word 
Reasoning.  This analysis also reorganized the non-math subtests from the four cluster 
solution.  The first cluster contained most of the deductive reasoning tasks and tasks that 
required the reorganization of pictures, while the other reflected many inductive 
reasoning tests and subtests with abstract stimuli.  These are merely generalizations, as 
each cluster contains some tests that do not fit neatly into these descriptions.  The 6 
cluster solution created an additional verbal-related cluster, though it did not contain all 
of the heavily verbal subtests (such as Similarities).  The 7 cluster solution created an 
additional math cluster containing only Math Reasoning. 
Table 8 
 
Three Cluster Solution 
  
 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
Picture Arrangement Analysis/Synthesis 
(Deduction) 
Numerical Operations 
Coding Mystery Codes Math Reasoning 
(Quantitative Reasoning) 
Logical Steps (Deduction) Classification Arithmetic (Quantitative 
Reasoning) 
Word Reasoning Picture Concepts 
(Induction) 
Applied Problems 
Visual-Auditory Learning Odd Item Out Calculation 
Planned Codes Matrix Reasoning  
Digit Span Story Completion  
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Similarities Concept Formation 
(Induction) 
 
Symbolic Memory Spatial Relations  
Nonverbal Memory Repeated Patterns  
Verbal Spatial Relations Seq. & Quant. Reasoning  
 Pattern Reasoning  
 Visual Coding  
 Number Matrices  
 Picture Completion  
 Number Series  
 
 
Table 9 
 
Four Cluster Solution 
  
 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
Applied Problems Pic. Arrangment Num. Operations 
 Coding Math Reasoning 
(Quantitative Reasoning) 
Cluster 4 Logical Steps (Deduction) Arithmetic (Quantitative 
Reasoning) 
Analysis/Synthesis 
(Deduction) 
Word Reasoning Calculation 
Mystery Codes Vis-Aud Learning  
Classification Planned Codes  
Picture Concepts 
(Induction) 
Digit Span  
Odd Item Out Similarities  
Matrix Reasoning Symbolic Memory  
Story Completion Nonverbal Memory  
Concept Formation 
(Induction) 
Verb. Spat. Rel  
Spatial Relations   
Repeated Patterns   
Seq./Quant Reason.   
Pattern Reasoning   
Visual Coding   
Number Matrices   
Pic. Completion   
Number Series   
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Table 10 
 
Five Cluster Solution 
  
 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
Picture Arrangment Applied Problems Num. Operations 
Analysis/Synthesis 
(Deduction) 
 Math Reasoning 
(Quantitative Reasoning) 
Logical Steps (Deduction) Cluster 5 Arithmetic (Quantitative 
Reasoning) 
Mystery Codes Coding Calculation 
Planned Codes Word Reasoning  
Similarities Vis. Aud. Learning  
Story Completion Digit Span  
Verbal Spatial Rel. Symbolic Memory  
Picture Completion Nonverbal Memory  
Number Series   
   
Cluster 4   
Classification   
Picture Concepts 
(Induction) 
  
Odd Item Out   
Matrix Reasoning   
Concept Formation 
(Induction) 
  
Spatial Relations   
Repeated Patterns   
Seq./Quant Reason   
Pattern Reasoning   
Visual Coding   
Number Matrices   
 
 
Table 11 
 
Six Cluster Solution 
  
 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
Picture Arrangment Classification Num. Operations 
Analysis/Synthesis 
(Deduction) 
Picture Concepts 
(Induction) 
Math Reasoning 
(Quantitative Reasoning) 
Logical Steps (Deduction) Odd Item Out Arithmetic (Quantitative 
Reasoning) 
Mystery Codes Matrix Reasoning Calculation 
Simlarities Concept Formation  
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(Induction) 
Story Completion Spatial Relations Cluster 6 
Picture Completion Repeated Patterns Word Reasoning 
Number Series Seq/Quant Reason Verbal Spatial Rel. 
 Pattern Reasoning  
Cluster 4 Visual Coding  
Applied Problems Number Matrices  
   
 Cluster 5  
 Coding  
 Vis. Aud. Learning  
 Planned Codes  
 Symbolic Memory  
 Nonverbal Memory  
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Seven Cluster Solution 
  
 
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Cluster 3 
Pic.Arrangement Math Reasoning 
(Quantitative Reasoning) 
Num. Operations 
Analysis/Synthesis 
(Deduction) 
 Arithmetic (Quantitative 
Reasoning) 
Logical Steps (Deduction) Cluster 5 Calculation 
Mystery Codes Coding  
Similarities Vis. Aud. Learning Cluster 6 
Story Completion Planned Codes Word Reasoning 
Picture Completion Digit Span Verbal Spatial Rel. 
Number Series Symbolic Memory  
 Nonverbal Memory  
Cluster 4   
Applied Problems   
   
Cluster 7   
Classification   
Picture Concepts 
(Induction) 
  
Odd Item Out   
Matrix Reasoning   
Concept Formation 
(Induction) 
  
Spatial Relations   
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Repeated Patterns   
Seq/Quant Reason   
Pattern Reasoning   
Visual Coding   
Number Matrics   
 
 
 Validity Check.  The WJ-III Ach Applied Problems subtest, a task similar to the 
Math Reasoning subtest was included as a validity check to ascertain whether participants 
were being reasonably vigilant in their sorting.  Since the task descriptions of these 
subtests were very similar, if participants were being vigilant, then these tasks should be 
located within the same clusters.  As reported in Table 7, Applied Problems was located 
within the same cluster as Math Reasoning in the three cluster solution.  However, these 
subtests did not appear in the same cluster in any other solution.  It is interesting to note 
that other than in the three cluster solution, Applied Problems consistently was the only 
member in its cluster. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
 
Summary of Results 
 The purpose of this study was to assess whether judging subtest similarities based 
on task demand data lead to similar results when judging subtest similarity using ability 
data.  It compared two methods of subtest classification, a confirmatory factor analysis 
using ability data, and a cluster analysis of  similarity ratings  of subtests’ functional task 
demands.  These two methods are salient in literature supporting practices in cross-
battery assessment (e.g. Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007; Frisby & Parkin, 2007), where 
subtests from cognitive batteries are generally classified into broad ability categories 
through confirmatory factor analyses, while classified into narrow ability categories 
through functional task analysis processes. 
 Phase I – Ability Classification Through Factor Analysis.  Results indicated that 
the originally planned three factor solution would not converge properly, because the 
correlations between the latent deductive reasoning factor with both the latent inductive 
and quantitative reasoning factors were estimated to be greater than 1, and error variance 
associated with the dedutive reasoning was estimated to be less than 0.  However, 
reanalysis of a two factor solution specifying an inductive reasoning and a quantitative 
reasoning factor converged properly, and allowed for comparison with a one-factor 
model.  An analysis of goodness-of-fit statistics indicated that both the one-factor and 
two-factor models provided excellent fits for the data.  Nevertheless, the two-factor 
model provided a slightly better fit on many indexes and was retained as the best 
solution.  This model placed Arithmetic and Math Reasoning on a quantitative reasoning 
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factor, and Picture Concepts and Concept Formation on an inductive reasoning factor.  
These subtest pairs appear to measure different, albeit strongly related cognitive abilities.  
 Findings from this analysis confirm the narrow ability classifications suggested by 
other researchers.  Flanagan and colleagues (2007) suggested that Picture Concepts 
measured inductive reasoning and Arithmetic reflected a measure of quantitative 
reasoning, classifications reported by Keith et. al. (2006).  Picture Concepts loaded 
heavily on the same factor as Concept Formation a test confirmed in numerous studies as 
a measure of inductive reasoning (e.g. Flanagan & McGrew, 1998; Keith, Kranzler, & 
Flanagan, 2001; Phelps, McGrew, Knopik & Ford, 2005; Roid, 2003; Sanders et al., 
2007; Woodcock, 1990).  Arithmetic loaded strongly with the WIAT-II’s Math 
Reasoning subtest, a measure used to assess math achievement skills which confirms the 
quantitative nature of its task demands. 
 Phase II - Classification of Functional Task Demands.  Phase two of this study 
required practitioners to classify subtests by  inferring the abilities a subtest may measure 
through a description of their functional task demands.  These similarity judgements were 
subjected to series of non-hierarchical cluster analysis, where 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 cluster 
solutions were specified.  The relative locations of the three target pairs of subtests were 
tracked across solutions.  Results indicated that it took a minimum of 5 clusters to place 
the subtests into their hypothesized pairs.  The location of each subtest in the 3 target 
pairs varied across the number of solutions.  For instance, the inductive reasoning pair, 
Concept Formation and Picture Concepts were placed within the same cluster in all 
solutions. The quantitative reasoning pair, Arithmetic and Math Reasoning, were placed 
within the same cluster in the initial 3 cluster solution, and stayed together in all solutions 
 86
except the 7 cluster solution.  The deductive reasoning pair, Logical Steps and Analysis 
Synthesis, were not placed in the same cluster until the five cluster solution.  However, 
these two subtests continued to be placed together in the six and seven cluster solutions. 
 The validity check subtest pair, Math Reasoning and Applied Problems, were 
placed in the same cluster only in the three cluster solution.  This could suggest that 
participants were not paying close attention to while they were sorting subtests, as these 
tasks’ descriptions were very similar.  However, it is interesting to note that after the 
three cluster solution, Applied Problems was consistently in its own cluster, not placed 
with any other subtest.  It could be that participants considered this particular description 
to be unique when compared to the other descriptions, perhaps because it was selected 
from an achievement battery.  However, Math Reasoning is also from an achievement 
battery.   
 It was possible to determine patterns among how tasks were sorted during the 
cluster analysis, though most cluster membership appeared highly variable.  In general, 
clusters were most congruent in terms of the broad abilties they contained, but not in their 
narrow abilities.  Specifically, inductive and deductive reasoning tasks were often 
included together.  Visual-spatial tasks were also often included with reasoning tasks, 
results that have occurred in similar studies (Frisby & Parkin, 2007). 
Comparison of Findings 
Providing tentative support to the use of task analysis when classifying subtests 
into narrow ability categories, there appears to be some congruence between the results of 
the CFA and the cluster analysis.  The 5 cluster solution, where the target subtests first 
grouped together, appears to discriminate between inductive, deductive and quantitative 
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reasoning tasks.  As mentioned earlier, there appears to also be significant variability 
within clusters.  For instance, Mystery Codes (a test hypothesized to be a measure of 
inductive reasoning) was classified with Logical Steps and Analysis/Synthesis, this 
study’s indicators of deductive reasoning.  Similarly, Visual Codes (a hypothesized 
measure of deductive reasoning) was grouped with Concept Formation and Picture 
Concepts, measures of inductive reasoning.  Thus, although the target tests clustered as 
expected in the 5 cluster solution, not every task included in the classification was sorted 
with tasks to which they were considered similar by cross-battery guidebooks.   
It is possible that the variability in the clusters is related to participants clustering 
tasks more on their surface level features, rather than on the cognitive processes they 
measure.  Evidence for this is equivocal.  For instance, many of the math subtests sorted 
together, regardless of whether they were of an applied nature, or if they relied more on 
the ability to do rote math compuation, a finding that suggests participants were focusing 
more on surface level features.  However, Number Series, and Number Matrices did not 
tend to sort with the other tests involving numbers.  Since these tasks are considered 
measures of quantitative reasoning rather than knowledge abilities, it may suggest that 
participants were vigilent regarding the cognitive processes they require.  Tasks related to 
processing speed and memory abilities tended to cluster together, likely because these 
abilities are easily discernable from reasoning and visual-processing types of tasks.  One 
reason may be due to the fact that the difference between these tasks are related to the 
broad abilities they may measure, rather than narrow abilities.   
Participants may have a more difficult time distinguishing between narrow 
abilities using task analysis than distinguishing between broad abilities. For instance, the 
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cluster analysis results suggested that participants mixed inductive and deductive 
reasoning tasks.  There appear to be two related reasons behind why inductive and 
deductive reasoning abilities were difficult to discriminate in the task analysis.  First, 
these abilities tend to both be required in reasoning tasks.  For example, in Concept 
Formation, considered a measure of inductive reasoning, the final step to solve a puzzle 
actually requires a deductive step to determine the right answer. Second, the results of the 
sorting task may be influenced by participants’ level of knowledge of CHC theory.  
Participants who completed the sorting task successfully (e.g. had no missing data), had a 
mean rating of 3.16 when rating their knowledge of CHC theory, and rated their use of it 
in practice a 2.60.  From these ratings, it appears that participants did not consider 
themselves especially knowledgeable of CHC theory.  They may not use constructs such 
as fluid reasoning, induction or deduction in practice, and may not have been considering 
them when sorting the tasks.  Kaufman (1994) highlighted that task analysis may be 
highly dependant on the analyzer’s theoretical perspective.  As a result, it is possible that 
clinicians very familiar with CHC theory may classify tasks more in line with CHC 
theory than clinicians who are less familiar with the theory.  Also, since the validity 
check pair of subtests did not sort together consistently, it is also possible that 
participants were not highly vigalent during the sorting.    
Implications of Findings 
 Results from these two investigations suggest partial support for a) the constructs 
of induction, deduction and quantitative reasoning narrow abilities, and b) similarity 
between two methods of subtest task classification.  A number of issues limited 
interpretation of findings.  First, the ability data used in this investigation could not allow 
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for interpretation of a three-factor model to directly compare to a one-factor model, and a 
two-factor model had to be created.  Second, task analysis data sorted as hypothesized 
when a five-cluster solution was specified, but the hypthesized sorting was not 
maintained in subsequent solutions with a larger number of clusters.  Third, the validity 
check pair of subtests did not sort together consistently. 
 Findings from the confirmatory factor analysis support the interpretation of 
inductive reasoning and quantitative reasoning abilities as both distinct, but related 
abilities (Flanagan & McGrew, 1997; Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007 Flanagan, 
McGrew & Ortiz, 2000).  This finding underscores the cross-battery assessment practice 
of interpreting tests at the broad ability level, unless the scores of the subtests are 
significantly discrepant from each other (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso).  Such practice 
acknowledges that narrow ability measures appear highly associated, though may be 
differently developed in some individuals.  However, this interpretation must be made 
cautiously, as the three-factor solution, could not converge properly. 
 Similarities between the CFA and the cluster analysis suggests that task analysis 
may have potential as a method of narrow ability classification.  It provides additional 
support to the expert consensus classification studies previously discussed (e.g. Flanagan, 
Ortiz, Alfonso, & Mascolo, 2001; McGrew, 1997). However, the cluster analysis used in 
this investigation is associated with significant limitations. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Results from these analyses should be interpreted in light of significant 
limitations.  The sample size used in the CFA reflects one limitation, and may be the 
reason the three-factor model was not positive definite (Brown, 2006; Marsh & Hau, 
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1999).  Brown (2006) argues that small sample sizes are often more suspect to the 
influence of outliers, collinearities and poor approximations of normality.  According to  
Brown (2006), and Marsh and Hau (1999), small sample sizes are at high risk for 
improper solutions when there are few indicators per latent variables (especially 2 
indicators), a condition present in the current research.  These authors recommend that 
CFA studies with small sample sizes should include numerous (e.g. 4, 5 or more) 
indicators per latent factor and that these indicators should all be strong (factor loadings 
higher than .6).  Future research may use more subtests to account for narrow abilities.  
Relatedly, though this investigation’ssample’s ability distribution did not department 
signifiantly from normality, greater representation of a full range of ability level may 
have also been helpful in avoiding a Heywood case, as it would have minimized a 
restriction of range. 
Other limitations can be inferred from the results of Floyd et al. (2005), who 
demonstrated that score differences from batteries that presumably measuring the same 
construct are due to a number of factors.  These researchers reported that in general, 
sampling characteristics, the date of a sample, and the scaling of a subtest (e.g. 
differences in standardized means and standard deviations) do not have a systematic 
influence on score differences, but battery floor and ceilings do appear associated with 
such differences.  In this study, the WISC-IV is normed on youth between the ages of 6 
and 16, while the WJ-III Cog is normed on individuals between the ages of 2 to 90+.  As 
a result, the WJ-III Cog will have a lower floor and a higher ceiling.  Though likely this 
effect was minimal on the results of this investigation, future research may wish to guard 
against this influence by using test batteries with more similar floors or ceilings. 
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 The number of narrow abilities represented in this study further limit 
interpretation of its results.  While fluid reasoning abilities were well represented in the 
tasks used in this investigation, it is likely that the target subtests also measure mulitple 
narrow abilities that were not adequately represented.  For instance, researchers have 
debated whether Arithmetic measures a combination of math knowledge, quantitative 
reasoning and working memory skills (Keith et. al., 2006; Keith & Witta, 1997; Phelps et 
al., 2005).  Similarly, success on Math Reasoning may also require significant 
quantitative knowledge skills.  Picture Concepts, besides requiring inductive reasoning 
abilities, may also tap significant prior knowledge.  Due to the limited focus of the 
present study, these analyses can not give a full understanding of the abilities these tests 
may measure.  The variation within the cluster sorting also supports this assertion.  For 
instance, Number Series and Number Matrices, subtests more associated with quantitative 
reasoning (Flanagan, Ortiz & Alfonso, 2007), were sorted with this study’s deductive 
reasoning target tests.   
 There are also limitations associated with this investigation’s method of task 
analysis.  Discussed previously, participants in this investigation did not consider 
themselves experts on CHC theory.  Differences between these results and previous task 
analyses reported in McGrew (1997) and Flanagan, Ortiz, Alfonoso and Mascolo (2001) 
may be associated with differences in participants’ experience, or lack of experience, 
using CHC theory.  Future research is needed to understand how participants’ experience 
with CHC theory may alter how they interpret subtests.  Future researchers may better 
investigate this influence by asking two groups of clincians, one group with signficant 
 92
CHC knowledge, and one without CHC level knowledge, to perform the sorting task and 
describe whether any differences exist.   
 The non-hierarchical analysis used in this investigation relied on random seeds as 
initial cluster solutions, which may also represent a limitation.  Some scholars (e.g. Hair 
& Black, 2000) consider non-hierarchical analyses to be most useful when the 
investigator can provide initial estimates of cluster solutions, because solutions can be 
dependent on the initial seeds.  However, it is interesting to note that the target subtests in 
this investigation generally cluster together even with random seeds were used, and 
maintained their cluster membership across mulitple solutions.  Future research using 
similar methodology may wish to use the target subtests as centers for clusters to better 
determine which subtests would cluster with them. 
 Though the present study does indicate that there is a level of congruence between 
the two methods of narrow ability classification, it does not provide a measure of the 
degree of that congruence.  Five clusters were necessary before the target subtests were 
sorted into the same clusters, but it is not possible to discern whether that is a high level 
of congruence, or only a moderate or low level.  One way to gain greater understanding 
of the degree of congruence would be to follow procedures outlined in Frisby and Parkin 
(2007).  These researchers used multidimensional scaling (MDS) methods to quantify a 
difference between different subtests’ task demands on a three-dimensional space.  Future 
research could follow their methods to quantify task demand differences, and then 
correlate those differences to differences between subtest ability correlations.   
Conclusions 
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 The presented study investigated two methods of subtest narrow ability 
classification, ability analyis and task analysis, while targeting fluid reasoning tasks.  
Both are prevalent in cross-battery assessment literature, used as methods to ensure 
adequate construct representation in the assessment process.  Current results tentatively 
support the use of cross-battery assessment pillar III, (at least in terms of the narrow fluid 
reasoning abilities inductive and quantitative reasoning), because of overlap in the two 
classification processes. 
 Similar to those from Frisby and Parkin (2007), the present results provide an 
empirical method of understanding subtest task demands, a goal of researchers and 
clinicians alike (Carroll, 1976; Floyd, 2005; Kaufman, 1994).  They also support the need 
for the integration of information-processing and psychometric research on cognitive 
tasks (e.g. Floyd, 2005).  Floyd stresses that Carroll’s coding scheme (1976) for cognitive 
tasks reflects an important stepping stone for investigating this area.  To support that 
process, more research is need to validate the coding scheme and discern how it relates to 
CHC theory, but the methods outlined here could help with that process. 
 Though there may be a place for the rational process of individual clinicians when 
engaging in the task analysis process (e.g. Kaufman, 1994), empirical investigation of 
task demands  may better validate what attributes of tasks are more interpretable than 
others.  For instance, Kaufman has suggested that the both the length of an examinee 
response and the method of stimuli presentation are an important aspect of a task.  But 
researchers do not yet know if they are equally important.  Future research on task 
analysis may better answer these questions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Subtest Descriptions 
 
Induction 
 
Concept Formation     WJ-III Cog 
 
19)  The examinee views a page containing rows of  shapes that differ according to a 
combination of size (big, small), color (red, yellow), and shape (circles, squares, 
triangles).  To answer, the examinee must articulate the rule that explains why some 
shapes in a row are enclosed in a box while others in the row are not.  
 
Picture Concepts     WISC-IV 
 
10)  The examinee views two or three rows of pictures of concrete objects on a page. To 
answer, the examinee points to or names one picture from each row that belong in the 
same category.   
 
Pattern Reasoning     KABC-II 
 
24)  The examinee views a page showing a pattern of geometric, abstract, or concrete 
figures, where an object in each pattern is missing. To answer, the examinee must 
determine the pattern and use that information to point to, or name a response from a row 
of choices the best completes the pattern. Examinees receive bonus points for fast 
answers, though there is no time limit. 
 
Story Completion     KABC-II 
 
18)  The examinee views a row of pictures that tell an incomplete story (one or more 
pictures are missing in the story).  To answer, the examinee must determine the pattern 
demonstrated in the story and complete the story by selecting a picture(s) from a number 
of cards presented to them by the examiner.  Items are timed.  
 
Mystery Codes     KAIT 
 
7)  The examinee views a page that demonstrates a code associating symbols with 
different characteristics of an abstract or concrete figure.  To answer, the examinee must 
determine the code in order to apply it to a new picture, and point to, name or circle the 
correct code.  Examinees can use paper and pencil to help them solve the problems.  
Items are timed. 
 
Classification      Leiter-R 
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9)  The examinee views a row of pictures depicting concrete or abstract figures.  The 
examinee is presented with a number of cards that have similar figures on them.  To 
answer, the examinee must categorize these cards by placing them in front of the figure 
with which they share an essential similarity.  
 
Repeated Patterns     Leiter-R 
 
21)  The examinee views a page with a number of rows that depict a pattern of abstract or 
concrete figures, with part of the pattern missing.  The examinee is presented with a 
number of cards that have similar figures on them.  The examinee must determine the 
pattern in the page and use that information to select the missing parts of the pattern from 
the cards.  To answer, the examinee places the correct cards in the missing part of the 
pattern. 
 
Matrix Reasoning     WISC-IV 
 
15)  The examinee views a page with a matrix of abstract figures with one section 
missing.  Five possible responses are listed on the bottom of the page.  The examinee 
must determine the relationship between the figures in the matrix and then use that 
relationship to decide which of the five responses best fits in the matrix.  To answer, the 
examinee points at or names their choice from the five responses. 
 
Deduction
 
Analysis/Synthesis     WJ-III Cog 
 
4)  The examinee views pages containing squares of different colors.  The examiner 
teachers the examinee a variety of equations about relationships between colors (e.g., a 
blue square is the same as a yellow square with a red square). The examinee is shown 
additional pages that show groups of colored squares arranged in equations, with a 
missing, blank square.  To answer, the examinee names the color that belongs in the 
blank square, according to the color equations learned previously.   
 
Logical Steps      KAIT 
 
5)  The examiner reads a set of rules or premises about the relationships between 
different characters in a diagram to the examinee while the examinee views the diagram.  
To answer, the examinee uses these premises to verbally provide responses to questions 
about characters’ relative placement within that diagram.  Examinees may use scratch 
paper to solve the problems.  Items are timed. 
 
Visual Coding      Leiter-R 
 
28)  The examinee views an easel page containing abstract and concrete stimuli.  The 
examinee is taught a number of equations (e.g. a spoon goes with a star, or a pencil is the 
same as a circle and a triangle).  Examinees must use these equations to answer items 
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printed at the bottom of the page.  Potential responses are printed on cards.  To answer, 
the examinee must select the correct card and place it next to the item it answers. 
 
 
Quantitative Reasoning 
 
Number Matrices     WJ-III 
 
30)  The examinee views a page that contains a two-dimensional matrix of numbers with 
a one number missing.  The examinee looks for a relationship rule between the numbers, 
and then must identify the number that satisfies the rule to fill the missing section.  To 
answer, the examinee verbally states the missing number. 
 
Number Series     WJ-III 
 
32)  The examinee views a page that shows a row of numbers with a number missing.  
The examinee must determine a pattern within the series of numbers.  To answer, the 
examinee verbally states the missing number. 
 
Arithmetic      WISC-IV 
 
17)  The examinee hears a math word problem read by the examiner.  To answer, the 
examinee verbally states their response to the problem, without the use of scratch paper.  
Each item is timed. 
 
Sequential & Quantitative Reasoning   DAS-II 
 
22)  The examinee sees three boxes containing pairs of numbers, however the last box 
has one number missing.  The examinee determines the relationship between the pairs of 
numbers in the first two boxes and uses that information to determine the missing number 
in the third box.  To answer, the examinee verbally states the missing number. 
 
Mathematics Reasoning    WIAT-II (VALIDITY) 
 
14)  The examinee views a page depicting a math story problem.  The examinee must 
figure out the type of math operations necessary to solve the story problem.  The 
examinee must then apply those operations to the information in the story.  To answer, 
the examinee must verbally state their answer.  The examinee may use scratch paper if 
they wish.  
 
Applied Problems     WJ-III Achievement (VALIDITY) 
 
25)  The examinee views a page showing a math story problem.  The examinee must 
determine the type of math operations required by the story problem, and then apply 
those operations to the information in the story.  To answer, the examinee must verbally 
state their response.  The examinee may use scratch paper if they wish. 
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Distractors 
 
Nonverbal Memory RIAS  Gv Visual Memory 
 
26)  The examiner shows the examinee a target abstract or concrete figure for 5 seconds.  
To answer, the examinee points to the figure they saw when it is embedded within an 
array of similar, distractor figures. 
 
Symbolic Memory     UNIT  Gv Visual Memory 
 
23)  The examiner presents the examinee with tiles of symbolic figures that vary in color 
(green & black), sex (man & woman) and age (boy/man & girl/woman).  The examiner 
creates a sequence of these tiles.  To answer, the examinee must recreate the sequence 
from memory. 
 
Odd-Item-Out  RIAS  Gv Visualization (Vz) 
 
13)  The examinee views a page containing a number of abstract figures.  One figure is 
different from the other items on the page.  To answer, the examinee must point to the 
picture that does not belong with the others.  
 
Picture Arrangement     WISC-III  Gv Visualization 
 
1)  The examiner presents the examinee with a number of cards.  Each card depicts a part 
of a story.  To answer, the examinee must arrange the cards in an order that tells a logical 
story.  Each item is timed. 
 
Picture Completion WISC-IV Gv Flexibility of Closure  
 
31)  The examinee views a page containing a common picture or scene.  The examinee 
must determine what part of the picture or scene is missing.  To answer the examinee 
must point to or name the missing part of the picture.  Each item is timed. 
 
Spatial Relations  WJ-III Cog Gv Spatial Relations 
 
20)  The examinee views a page that shows a row of shape fragments that are part of a 
whole and a number of distractor fragments.  The examinee must determine which 
fragments are used to create the whole.  To answer, the examinee must verbally state or 
point to the correct fragments.  
 
Visual-Auditory              WJ-III Cog  Gsm Associative Memory 
Learning 
 
8)  The examinee views a page with a number of simple figures printed on it.  The 
examiner teaches the examinee a code by pointing to a figure and saying its 
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corresponding name.  Next, the examiner shows the examinee a sequence of the figures.  
To answer, the examinee must remember the code to recite the names of the pictures. 
 
Digit/Symbol Coding  WISC-IV Gs Rate-of-Test-Taking 
 
2)  The examinee views a page that presents a code associating a number with a simple 
symbol.  The examinee must use the code to draw the symbols in boxes associated with 
each number.  To answer, the examinee must copy as many symbols as possible under a 
time limit, and in a sequential manner. 
 
Planned Codes CAS  Gs Rate-of-Test-Taking 
 
11)  The examinee views a page that presents a code associating a letter with a answer 
that consists of X’s and O’s.  The examinee is told to use the code to fill in boxes 
associated with each letter.  To answer, the examinne must copy as many codes as 
possible under a time limit.  At the end of the time limit, the examinee explains the 
strategy they used to complete the task. 
 
Verbal-Spatial Relations CAS  Gc Listening Ability 
 
29)  The examinee views a page the shows six similar pictures consisting of either 
abstract or concrete figures. The examinee also listens to a question printed at the bottom 
of a page that is read by the examiner.  The question refers to spatial relationships 
depicted in the pictures.  To answer, the examinee must point at, or verbally state the 
picture that best answers the question. 
 
Digit Span  WISC-IV Gsm Memory Span 
 
12)  The examinee hears a list of single digit numbers, read by the examiner.  To answer, 
the examinee must repeat the string of digits in either a forward or backward order. 
 
Calculation  WJ-III Achievement Gq Mathematical Achievement 
 
27)  The examinee is presented with a worksheet that includes progressively more 
challenging math problems.  To answer, the examinee writes the answer to as many math 
problems as he or she can.   
 
Numerical Operations WIAT Gq Mathematical Achievement 
 
3)  The examinee solves increasingly difficult math problems while completing a 
worksheet.  To answer, the examinee writes the answer to as many math problems as 
possible. 
 
Similarities  WISC-IV Gc 
 
 99
16)  The examinee hears two objects or concepts read by the examiner.  The examinee 
must determine how the two objects or concepts are alike.  To answer, the examinee 
responds verbally with a brief answer. 
 
Word Reasoning WISC-IV Gc 
 
6)  The examinee listens to a series of clues about an unknown object or concept read by 
the examiner.  The examinee uses the clues to guess the object or concept.  To answer, 
the examinee verbally states the response. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Data Sheets 
 
Instructions: 
 
1) Fill out the demographic form on page 2 of this packet. 
 
2) You have received a packet of 32 descriptions of subtests from common cognitive 
test batteries.  Please sort these descriptions into piles based on similarities you 
see in the cognitive abilities these tests measure – do NOT sort them based on the 
cognitive battery they come from.  You can sort the descriptions into as many 
categories as you wish.  However, you must make at least 3 categories.  Also, 
each category must contain at least 2 cards. 
 
3) After you have sorted all 32 descriptions, please record your responses on the data 
sheet provided on page 3. 
 
Record your responses by writing down the number of the subtest descriptions in 
each category next to each other on this sheet. 
 
For example:  
 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category X 
3 8 2 9 
32 14 12 1 
19 17  31 
 28   
 4   
 18   
 29   
  
Remember to make at least 3 categories.  Each category must contain at least 
2 descriptions. 
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  Demographic Information   
          
Date:    Age:    Sex:   
         
Please Check All That Apply 
         
  School Psychology Graduate Student 
  Credentialed School Psychological Examiner 
  Credentialed School Psychologist 
  Licensed Psychologist 
  Educational Diagnostician 
  Other 
         
District Employed (If Applicable)   
University Enrolled (If Applicable)   
         
Number of Years as a Paid Practitioner       
         
Please indicate the cognitive (intelligence) scales on which you have had prior experience administering 
(Check all that apply): 
         
  Bayley Scales of ID    RIAS (Reynolds) 
  Bayley Scales of ID-II    SIT-R (Slosson) 
  CAS     Stanford-Binet IV 
  CTONI    Stanford-Binet V 
  DAS    UNIT 
 DAS-II    WAIS-III 
  DTLA-3    WISC-III 
  DTLA-4    WISC-IV 
  KABC    Woodcock Johnson R (Cog) 
  KABC-II    Woodcock Johnson-III (Cog) 
  KAIT    WPPSI-R 
  K-BIT    WPPSI-3 
  Leiter IPS-R    
         
Please read the following statements are circle the number that most corresponds with your atttude. 
         
I am knowledgeable about the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities. 
1 2 3 4 5     
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree     
         
I use the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities when interpreting test results. 
1 2 3 4 5     
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree     
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Data Record Sheet 
Record your responses by writing down the number of the subtest descriptions in each category that you 
create next to each other on this sheet. 
 
For example: 
 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category X 
3 8 2 9 
32 14 12 1 
19 17  31 
 28   
 4   
 18   
 29   
 
Please record your responses below.  Make as many categories as you like, but remember to make at 
least 3 categories.  Each category must contain at least 2 descriptions.  Remember, do NOT sort them 
based on the cognitive batteries they may come from. 
 
 
 103
Informed Consent 
 
 This form requests your consent to participate in a research study investigating task 
demands similarities of cognitive subtests used in school psychology assessment practice.  The 
project is under the direction of Craig Frisby, Ph.D, and has been approved by the University of 
Missouri Institutional Review Board. 
 
 Project description:  Your participation involves a single meeting with a graduate student.  
To participate, you will provide general demographic information, and sort a stack of cards that 
contain descriptions of cognitive subtests into a number of categories and record your responses 
on record sheets.  This task should require no more than 20 to 30 minutes.  There will be 
approximately 50 participants involved in this study. Individuals eligible to participate include 
individuals familiar with the administration and interpretation of common cognitive batteries. 
 
 Potential Benefits and Concerns:  There are neither any material benefits nor risks 
anticipated greater than those encountered in daily life. Results of the project may be useful to 
participants as knowledge relevant to school psychology practice.  If you decide to participate, 
you will be entered into a drawing for a $20 Starbucks Giftcard.   
 
 Confidentiality:  All information regarding your responses will be kept confidential 
according to legal and ethical guidelines.  Your name will not appear on any research protocols, 
but will be replaced by a code number.  No one that is not connected with this project will have 
access to these files.  In addition, any information gathered will not be shared with any outside 
person or agency unless for any reason you give us permission to do so.  After the project is 
complete, all data will be aggregated, making it impossible to identify one person’s test data.  No 
names of participants are used in any published material that may result from the study.   
 
 Participation is Voluntary:  Your participation is entirely voluntary.  You are free not to 
answer any question you do not choose to answer.  You can freely withdraw from the project at 
any time without negative consequences. After the completion of the study, all data pertaining to 
your participation will be kept for three years and then destroyed.   
 
 Questions?  Please call Dr. Craig Frisby at 573-884-2561 or Jason Parkin at (425)890-
2404 with any questions or concerns.  If you have questions about your rights as a research 
project participant, you may contact the MU Institutional Review Board at 573-882-9585.  
 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you have read and understand the above information. 
 
 
Signed: ______________________________________      Date: _________________ 
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Verbal Instructions Script 
 
I am conducting a research study on the similarities of the task demands of  cognitive 
subtests used in school psychology assessment practice.  The project is sponsored by the 
University of Missouri-Columbia under the direction of Craig Frisby, Ph.D.  The project has 
been approved by the University of Missouri Institutional Review Board.  
 
 If you choose to participate at this time I’ll ask you to do the following: first, you will 
complete a brief sheet requesting general demographic information. Next, you will be given a 
stack of cards that contain descriptions of cognitive subtests.  I’d like you to sort the cards into 
similar categories and record your responses on the answer sheets provided.  Participation 
should not require more than half an hour. 
 
 There are neither any material benefits nor risks anticipated greater than those 
encountered in daily life. We will be happy to share results of the project after it is complete.  
Also, a thank you for participating, we’ll have a quick lottery for a $20 Starbucks gift certificate 
afterwards. 
 
 All information regarding your answers will be kept confidential.  Your name will not 
appear on any research protocols study, but will be replaced by a code number.  All protocols 
will be kept in locked files in my office at the University of Missouri.  No one that is not connected 
with this project will have access to these files.  In addition, any information gathered will not be 
shared with any outside person or agency unless for any reason you give us permission to do so.  
After the project is complete, all data will be aggregated, making it impossible to identify one 
person’s test data.  No names of participants are used in any published material that may result 
from the study.  
 
 Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free not to participate. If you 
participate,  you are free not to answer any question you do not choose to answer.  You can freely 
withdraw from the project at any time without negative consequence. After completion of the 
study, all data pertaining to your participation will be kept for three years and then destroyed. 
Participation or non-participation will not affect (the course grades of university students who 
volunteer in this research, or) evaluations of employers. 
 
 Should you have questions, please call Dr. Craig Frisby at 573-884-2561 with any 
questions or concerns.  If you have questions about your rights as a research project participant, 
you may contact the MU Institutional Review Board at 573-882-9585. 
 
The consent forms I will pass out includes the information I have just shared with you. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Are you between the ages of 11 and 16? 
Earn a $5 Gift Certificate to McDonalds! 
 
Q: What is this for? 
 
A:  This is a study that looks at how kids can do different kinds of puzzles and solve 
problems.   
 
Q: What will I do? 
 
A: You will take six brief tests with a student from the University of Missouri.  The tests 
are puzzles that you will figure out by looking at shapes, or solving short math problems.  
The problems start out easy, but can get harder.  Try your best! 
 
Q: How long will it take? 
 
A: It will take about 45 minutes to do all six types of puzzles. 
 
Q: How many kids will be in the study?  
 
A: About 60 kids will be in this study. 
 
Q: Are there any risks? 
 
A: Your participation should not cause any more risk than you usually experience at 
school.  Some kids may feel frustrated when completing the puzzles.  They start out easy, 
but can get hard. 
 
Q: What will I get? 
 
A: Many kids think these puzzles are fun to do!  Also, as a “thank you” for your 
participation, you will receive a $5 gift certificate to McDonalds! 
 
Q: How do I sign up? 
 
A: To sign up, you and a parent must sign the attached form. 
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Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
 
The purpose of this form is to request your permission to include your student in a 
research project investigating the interpretation of intelligence tests.  The project is under 
the direction of Craig Frisby, Ph.D, and has been approved by the University of Missouri 
Institutional Review Board. 
 
Project Description.  Your student’s participation will involve meeting with a graduate 
student in school psychology from the University of Missouri.  The graduate student will 
administer six brief tests that assess your student’s ability to reason and solve novel 
problems. The graduate student will also collect general demographic data from your 
student.  This meeting should take approximately 45 minutes.   
 
Risks and Benefits.  There are no risks associated with this project that are greater than 
those that occur in everyday life.  Your student will be taking tests that begin with an 
easy difficulty level, though may become difficult for most youth.  Most youth will not 
answer every question correctly, and though they are not told whether they are right or 
wrong, some individuals may experience mild frustration during this process.  As a token 
of appreciation, your student will receive a samll gift certificate to McDonalds.  Results 
of this study will inform school psychologists and other educational professionals about 
the similarities and differences between common tests they use in practice, and may aid 
in a more accurate interpretation of results from these tests.    
 
Confidentiality:  All information regarding your students’ responses will be kept 
confidential according to legal and ethical guidelines.  Their name will not appear on any 
research protocols, but will be replaced by a code number.  All protocols will be kept in 
locked files in Jason Parkin’s office at the University of Missouri.  It will be destroyed 
after 3 years. No one that is not connected with this project will have access to these files.  
In addition, any information gathered will not be shared with any outside person or 
agency for any reason.  After the project is complete, all data will be aggregated, making 
it impossible to identify one person’s test data.  No names of participants will be used in 
any published material that may result from the study.   
 
Participation is Voluntary:  Your student’s participation is entirely voluntary.  You may 
freely withdraw them from the project at any time without negative consequences. After 
the completion of the study, all data pertaining to their participation will be kept for three 
years and then destroyed.   
 
Questions?  Please call Dr. Craig Frisby at 573-884-2561 with any questions or concerns.  
If you have questions about your rights as a research project participant, you may contact 
the MU Institutional Review Board at 573-882-9585.  
 
If your student is interested in participating, please sign this form.  Keep the above 
information for your records.   
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Parent Name (Please Print) 
 
  
   
Signature  Date 
 
   
Student Name (Please Print) 
 
  
   
Student Signature 
 
 Date 
 
 108
REFERENCES 
 
Atkinson R.C., & Shiffrin, R.M. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its 
control processes. In K.W. Spence & J.T. Spence (Eds.), The Psychology of 
learning and motivation (pp. 89-195). New York: Academic Press. 
Brown, T.A. (2006). Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Bryant, F.B., & Yarnold, P.R. (1995). Principal-components analysis and exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis.  In L.G. Grimm & P. R.Yarnold’s (Eds.) Reading 
and Understanding Multivariate Statistics (pp. 99-136). Washington, D.C: APA. 
Buckland, J.A., McGee, R.L. & Ehrler, D.J. (2001). An investigation of Gf-Gc theory in 
the older adult population: Joint factor analysis of the Woodcock-Johnson-
Revised and the Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude-Adult. Psychological Reports, 
88, 1161-1170. 
Carroll, J.B. (1976).  Psychometric tests as cognitive tasks: A new structure of intellect.  
In L.B. Resnick (Ed.), The Nature of Intelligence (pp. 27-56).  Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Carroll, J.B. (1993). Human Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor-Analytic Studies. 
Cambridge Cambridge, MA: University Press. 
Carroll, J.B. (1997). The three-stratum theory of cognitive abilities. In D.P. Flanagan, J.L. 
Genshaft & P.L. Harrison’s (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: 
Theories, tests and issues. (pp. 122-130). New York: Guilford Press. 
 109
Cattell, R.B. (1963). Theory of fluid and crystalized intelligence: A critical experiment. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 54, 1-22. 
Christou, C., & Papageorgiou, E. (2007). A framework of mathematics inductive 
reasoning. Learning and Instruction, 17, 55-66. 
Chronbach, L.J. & Snow, R.E. (1997). Aptitudes and Instructional Methods. New York: 
Irvington. 
Cohen, R.J. & Swerdlik, M.E. (2002). Psychological Testing and Assessment: An 
Introduction to Test and Measurement, Fifth Edition. McGraw Hill. Boston, MA. 
DeCarlo, L. T. (1997). On the meaning and use of kurtosis. Psychological Methods, 2, 
292-307. 
Elliot, C.D. (1990). Differential Ability Scales. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological 
Corporation. 
Elliot, C.D. (2007). Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition. San Antonio, TX: The 
Psychological Corporation. 
Esters, I.G., Ittenbach, R.F., & Han, K. (1997). Today’s IQ tests: Are they really better 
than their historical predecessors? School Psychology Review, 26, 211-224. 
Evans, J.J., Floyd, R.G., McGrew, K.S., & Leforgee, M.H. (2002). The relations between 
measures of Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) cognitive abilities and reading 
achievement during childhood and adolescence. School Psychology Review, 31, 
246-262.  
Flanagan, D.P. (2000). Wechsler-based CHC cross-battery assessment and reading 
achievement: Strengthening the validity of interpretations drawn from Wechsler 
test scores. School Psychology Quarterly, 15, 295-329.
 110
Flanagan, D.P. & Kaufman, A.S. (2004). Essentials of WISC-IV Assessment. Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Flanagan, D.P., & McGrew, K.S. (1997). A cross-battery approach to assessing and 
interpreting cognitive abilities: Narrowing the gap between practice and cognitive 
science.  In D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft & P.L. Harrison (Eds.), Contemporary 
Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests and Issues (pp. 314-325). New York: 
Guilford. 
Flanagan, D.P., & McGrew, K.S. (1998). Interpreting intelligence tests from 
contemporary Gf-Gc theory: Joint confirmatory factor analysis of the WJ-R and 
KAIT in a non-white sample. Journal of School Psychology, 36, 151-182. 
Flanagan, D.P., McGrew, K.S. & Ortiz, S.O. (2000). The Wechsler Intelligence Scales 
and Gf-Gc Theory: A Contemporary Approach to Interpretation. Boston, MA: 
Allyn & Bacon. 
Flanagan, D.P., Ortiz, S.O., Alfonso, V.C., & Mascolo, J.T. (2001). The Achievement 
Test Desk Reference: Comprehensive Assessment and Learning Disabilities. 
Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Flanagan, D.P., Ortiz, S.O., & Alfonso, V.C. (2007). Essentials of Cross-Battery 
Assessment, Second Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Floyd, R.G. (2005). Information-processing approaches to interpretation of contemporary 
intellectual assessment instruments. In D.P. Flanagan & P.L. Harrison's (Eds.) 
Contemporary Intellectual Assessment, Second Edition (pp.  203-233).  New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
 111
Floyd, R.G., Berman, R., McCormack, A.C., Anderson, J.L., & Hargrove-Owen, G.L. 
(2005). Are Cattell-Horn-Carroll Broad Ability Composite Scores Exchangeable 
Across Batteries? School Psychology Review, 34, 329-357. 
Floyd, R.G., Evans, J.J., & McGrew, K.S. (2003). Relations between measures of Cattell-
Horn-Carroll (CHC) cognitive abilities and mathematics achievement across the 
school-age years. Psychology in the Schools, 40, 155-171.  
Floyd, R.G., McGrew, K.S., & Evans, J.J. (2008). The relative contributions of the 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) cognitive abilities in explaining writing achievement 
during childhood and adolescence.  Psychology in the Schools, 45, 132-144. 
Fiorello, C.A., & Primerano, D. (2005). Research into practice: Cattell-Horn-Carroll 
cognitive assessment in practice: Eligibility and program development issues. 
Psychology in the Schools, 42, 525-536.  
French, J.W., Ekstrom, R.B., & Price, L.A. (1963). Kit of reference tests for cognitive 
factors. Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Services. 
Frisby, C. L., & Parkin, J. R. (2007). Identifying similarities in cognitive subtest 
functional requirements: An empirical approach. Journal of School Psychology, 
45, 385-400. 
Glutting, J.J., Watkins, M.W., Konold, T.R., & McDermott, P.A. (2006). Distinctions 
without a difference: The utility of observed versus latent factors from the WISC-
IV in estimating reading and math achievement on the WIAT-II. The Journal of 
Special Education, 40, 103-114. 
Glutting, J.J., Watkins, M.W., & Youngstrom, E.A. (2003). Multifactored and cross-
battery ability assessments: Are they worth the effort? In C.R. Reynolds & R.W. 
 112
Kamphaus (Eds.). Handbook of Psychological and Educational Assessment of 
Children: Intelligence, Aptitude, and Achievement, Second Edition. (pp.343-374). 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
Goldman, S.R. & Pellegrino, J.W. (1984). Deductions about induction: Analyses of 
developmental and individual differences. In R.J. Sternberg (Eds.) Advances in 
the Psychology of Human Intelligence, Vol 2. (pp.149-198). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Hair, J.R. & Black, W.C. (2000). Cluster analysis.  In L.G. Grimm & P.R. Yarnold’s 
Reading and Understanding More Multivariate Statistics. Washington, D.C.: 
APA. 
Hammell, D.D. (1998). Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude- Fourth Edition. Austin, TX: 
Pro-Ed. 
Hammell, D. & Bryant, B. (1991). Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude – Adult.  Austin, 
TX: Pro-Ed. 
Horn, J.L.  (1998). A basis for research on age differences in cognitive capabilities. In J.J. 
McArdle & R.W. Woodcock (Eds.), Human Cognitive Abilities in Theory and 
Practice (pp. 57-87). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Horn, J.L. & Noll, J. (1997). Human cognitive capabilities: Gf-Gc Theory. In D.P. 
Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft & P.L. Harrison’s (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual 
Assessment: Theories, tests and issues. (pp. 53-91). New York: Guilford Press. 
Hu, L. & Bentler, P.M. (1999). Cut-off criteria for fit indexes incovariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling, 6, 1-55. 
 113
Jensen, A.R. (1992). Commentary: Vehicles of g.  Psychological Science, 3, 275-278. 
Jensen, A.R. (1998). The g factor.Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1999). Deductive reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 109-
135. 
Kahana, S.Y., Youngstrom, E.A., & Glutting, J.J. (2002). Factor and subtest 
discrepancies on the Differential Ability Scales: Examining prevalence and 
validity in predicting academic achievement. Assessment, 9, 82-93. 
Kamphaus, R.W., Petoskey, M.D. & Morgan, A.W. (1997). A history of intelligence test 
interpretation. In D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft & P.L. Harrison’s (Eds). 
Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, tests and issues. (pp. 32-47). 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Kaufman, A.S. & Kaufman, N.L. (1993). The Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence 
Test. Circle Pines, MN: American Guidance Service. 
Kaufman, A.S., Lichtenberger, E.O., Fletcher-Janzen, E., & Kaufman, N.L. (2005). 
Essentials of KABC-II Assessment. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Kaufman, A.S. & Kaufman, N.L. (2004). The Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, 
Second Edition. Circle Pines, MN: American Guidance Service. 
Kaufman, A.S. (1994). Intelligent testing with the WISC-III. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 
Keith, T.Z. (2005). Using confirmatory factor analysis to aid in understanding the 
constructs measured by intelligence tests. In D.P. Flanagan and P.L. Harrison 
(Eds.) Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, tests and issues, Second 
Edition. (pp. 581-624). New York: Guilford Press. 
 114
Keith, T.Z., Fine, J.G., Taub, G.E., Reynolds, M.R., & Kranzler, J.H. (2006). Higher 
order, multisample, confirmatory factor analysis with the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children – Fourth Edition: What does it measure? School Psychology 
Review, 35, 108-127. 
Keith, T.Z., Kranzler, J.H., & Flanagan, D.P. (2001). What does the Cognitive 
Assessment System (CAS) measure? Joint confirmatory factor analysis of the 
CAS and the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Ability (3rd Edition).  School 
Psychology Review, 30, 89-119.  
Keith, T. Z., & Witta, L. (1997). Hierarchical and cross-age confirmatory factor analysis 
of the WISC-III: What does it measure? School Psychology Quarterly, 12, 89-
107. 
Klem, L. (2000). Structural equation modeling. In L.G. Grimm & and P. R. Yarnold 
(Eds.) Reading and Understanding More Multivariate Statistics. (pp. 227-260). 
Washington D.C.: APA.
Kline, R. B. (2004). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (2nd ed.). 
 New York: Guilford Press. 
Kranzler, J.H. & Keith, T.Z. (1999). Independent confirmatory factor analysis of the 
Cognitive Assessment System (CAS): What does the CAS measure? School 
Psychology Review, 28, 117-144. 
Macmann, G.M. & Barnett, D.W. (1997). Myth of the master detective: Reliability of 
interpretations for Kaufman's “Intelligence Testing” approach to the WISC-III. 
School Psychology Quarterly, 12, 197-234. 
 115
Marsh, H.W. & Hau, K.T. (1999). Confirmatory factor analysis: Strategies for small 
sample sizes. In R.H. Hoyle’s (Ed). Satistical Strategies for Small Sample 
Research. (pp. 251-284). Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
McGhee, R. (1993). Fluid and crystallized intelligence: Confirmatory factor analyses of 
the Differential Abilities Scale, Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude-3, and 
Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised. In R.S. McCallum & 
B.A. Bracken (Eds.), Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised 
(pp. 20-38). Knoxville, TN: Psychoeducational Corp. 
McGrew, K.S. (1997). Analysis of the major intelligence batteries according to a 
proposed comprehensive Gf-Gc Framework. In D.P. Flanagan, J.L. Genshaft & 
P.L. Harrison’s (Eds). Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, tests and 
issues. (pp. 151-179). New York: Guilford Press. 
McGrew, K.S. (2009). CHC theory and the human cognitive abilities project: Standing on 
the shoulders of the giants of psychometric intelligence research. Intelligence, 37, 
1-10. 
McGrew, K.S. & Flanagan, D.P. (1997). Beyond g: The impact of Gf-Gc specific 
cognitive abilities research on the future use and interpretation of intelligence 
tests in the schools. School Psychology Review, 26, 189-210. 
McGrew, K.S. & Flanagan, D.P. (1998). The intelligence test desk reference (ITDR): Gf-
Gc cross-battery assessment. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
McGrew, K.S.&Woodcock, R.W. (2001). Technical Manual. Woodcock-Johnson III. 
Itasca, IL: Riverside Publishing. 
 116
McDermott, P. A., Fantuzzo, J. W., Glutting, J. J., Watkins, M. W., & Baggaley, A. R. 
(1992). Illusions of meaning in the ipsative assessment of children's ability. 
Journal of Special Education, 25, 504-526. 
McDermott, P.A. & Glutting, J.J. (1997). Informing stylistic learning behavior, 
disposition, and achievement through ability subtests—or, more illusions of 
meaning? School Psychology Review, 26, 163-175. 
McDermott, Paul A; Fantuzzo, John W; Glutting, Joseph J. (1990). Just say no to subtest 
analysis: A critique on Wechsler theory and practice. Journal of 
Psychoeducational Assessment, 8, 290-302. 
Messick, S. (1995). Validity of psychological assessment: Validation of inferences from 
persons’ responses and performance as a scientific inquiry into score meaning. 
American Psychologist, 50, 741-749. 
Muthen, L. K., & Muthen, B. O. (2007). Mplus version 5. [Computer software]. Los 
 Angeles: Muthen and Muthen. 
Naglieri, J.A. & Das, J.P. (1997). Cognitive Assessment System. Ithaca, IL: Riverside. 
Oh, H. J., Glutting, J. J., Watkins, M. W., Youngstrom, E. A., & McDermott, P. A. 
(2004). Correct interpretation of latent versus observed abilities: Implications 
from structural equation modeling applied to the WISC-III and WIAT linking 
sample. The Journal of Special Education, 38, 159–173. 
Pellegrino, J.W. & Glaser, R. (1982). Analyzing aptitudes for learning: Inductive 
reasoning.  In R. Glaser (Eds.) Advances in Instructional Psychology, Vol 2. 
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
 117
Pfeiffer, S.I., Reddy, L.A., Kletzel, J.E., Schmeizer, E.R. & Boyer, L.M. (2000). The 
practitioner's view of IQ testing and profile analysis. School Psychology 
Quarterly, 15, 376-385.  
Phelps, L., McGrew, K.S., Knopik, S.N., & Ford, L. (2005). The general (g), broad and 
narrow CHC stratum characteristics of the WJ III and WISC-III tests: A 
confirmatory cross-battery investigation. School Psychology Quarterly, 20, 66-88. 
Reynolds, C.R. & Kampaus, R.W. (2003). Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales. Lutz, 
FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Reynolds, M, R., Keith, T.Z., Fine, J.G., Fisher, M.E. & Low, J.A. (2007). Confirmatory 
factor structure of the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children – Second 
Edition: Consistency with Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory. School Psychology 
Quarterly, 22, 511-539. 
Rips, L.J. (1984). Reasoning as a central intellective ability. In R.J. Sternberg (Eds.) 
Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence, Vol 2. (pp.105-147). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Roid, G.H. (2003). Stanford Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition. Itasca, IL: Riverside 
Publishing. 
Roid, G.H., & Miller, L.J. (1995, 1997). Leiter International Performance Scale-Revised. 
Wood Dale, IL: Stoelting, Co. 
Sanders, S., McIntosh, D.E., Dunham, M., Rothlisberg, B.A., & Finch, H. (2007). Joint 
confirmatory factor analysis of the Differential Abilities Scale and the Woodcock-
Johnson Tests of Cognitive Abilities - Third Edition. Psychology in the Schools, 
44, 119-138. 
 118
Schrank, F.A. & Flanagan, D.P. (2003). WJ III Clinical Use and Interpretation. San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Spearman, C.E. (1904). “General intelligence,” objectively determined and measured. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 15, 201-293. 
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man: Their nature and measurement. New York: 
Macmillian. 
SPSS, Inc. (2002). SPSS 11.5 user's guide. Chicago, IL: SPSS, Inc. 
Sternberg, R. (1981). Testing and cognitive psychology. American Psychologist, 36, 
1181-1189. 
Sternberg, R.J. & Gardner, M.K. (1984). Unities in inductive reasoning. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 112, 80-116. 
Stalans, L.J. (1995). Multidimensional scaling. In L.G. Grimm & P.R. Yarnold (Eds.) 
Reading and Understanding Multivariate Statistics. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychological Association. 
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S. (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics (5th ed.). Boston: 
Pearson.  
Taub, G.E. & McGrew, K.S. (2004). A confirmatory factor analysis of Cattell-Horn-
Carroll theory and cross-age invariance of the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of 
Cognitive Abilities III. School Psychology Quarterly, 19, 72-87.  
Thorndike, R.L., & Hagen, E. Cognitive Abilities Test. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
Tusing, M.E. & Ford, L. (2004). Examining preschool cognitive abilities using a CHC 
framework. International Journal of Testing, 4, 91-114. 
 119
Watkins, M.W., Greenawalt, C.G., & Marcell, C.M. (2002). Factor structure of the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition among gifted students. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 62, 164-172. 
Watkins, M.W., Glutting, J.J., & Lei, Pui-Wa. (2007). Validity of the Full-Scale IQ when 
there is significant variability among WISC-III and WISC-IV factor scores. 
Applied Neuropsychology, 14, 13-20. 
Watkins, M.W., Glutting, J.J., & Youngstrom, E. A. (2005). Issues in subtest profile 
analysis.  In D.P. Flanagan & P.L. Harrison's (Eds.) Contemporary Intellectual 
Assessment, Second Edition (pp 251-268).  New York: The Guilford Press. 
Watkins, M. W., Glutting, J. J., & Youngstrom, E. A. (2003). Cross-battery cognitive 
assessment: Still concerned. NASP Communique, 31, 42-44. 
Watkins, M. W., Youngstrom, E. A., & Glutting, J. J. (2002). Some cautions concerning 
cross-battery assessment. NASP Communique, 30, 16-20.
Wechsler, D. (1974). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Revised. San Antonion, 
TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Wechsler, D. (1991). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition. San 
Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Wechsler, D. (2001). Wechsler Individual Achievement Test – Second Edition. San 
Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Wechsler, D. (2003a). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Fourth Edition. San 
Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Wechsler, D. (2003b). Wechsler Inlelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition: 
Technical and interpretive manual. San Anionio. TX: Psychological Corporation. 
 120
Woodcock, R.W. (1998). Extending Gf-Gc theory into practice. In J.J. McArdle & R.W. 
Woodcock’s (Eds.) Human Cognitive Abilities in Theory and Practice. (pp. 137-
156). 
Woodcock, R.W., & Johnson, M.B. (1989). Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational 
Battery – Revised. Allen, TX: DLM Teaching Resources. 
Woodcock, R. W., McGrew, K. S., & Mather, N. (2001). Woodcock–Johnson III Tests of 
Cognitive Abilities. Itasca, IL: Riverside Publishing. 
Youngstrom, E.A., Kogos, J.L., & Glutting, J.J. (1998). Incremental efficacy of 
Differential Ability Scales factor scores in predicting individual achievement 
criteria. School Psychology Quarterly, 14, 26-39. 
 
 121
VITA 
 
Jason Richard Parkin was born in Downers Grove, Illinois on December 8th, 1979, the 
son of Richard Bradford Parkin and Katherine Grinde Parkin.  After graduating from The 
International School, Bellevue Washington in 1998, he studied psychology at the 
University of Puget Sound, and graduated with a Bachelors of Arts in 2002.  In August of 
2003, he entered the doctoral program in school psychology at the University of 
Missouri.  He received his Masters of Arts degree in May of 2007, and completed an 
APA accredited internship with the Lewisville Independent School District, Lewisville, 
TX in July of 2009. 
 122
